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Krista R. Bowen
L Introduction
On February 28, 1995, the United States Supreme Court decided
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.l In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the
term "prospectus," as used in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act),2 applies only to initial public offerings of securities by issuers
or controlling shareholders.3 The Court's holding greatly restricted the
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Lyman Johnson for his
valuable insights in the development of this Note. The author also extends a special thanks
to Chanda Coblentz for her tireless editing of numerous drafts of this Note and to David
Bowen for his constant support and encouragement.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
2. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994) (providing statutory remedy
of rescission for material misrepresentations or omissions in prospectus). Section 771 states
that any person who:
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said sec-
ion), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral commu-
nication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of
this section, to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
Id.
3. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (1995).
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availability of rescission remedies against sellers who make material mis-
statements or omissions by means of a prospectus or oral communication. 4
With the erosion of Section 10(b) coverage in recent years,' Section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act has assumed greater prominence in securities litigation.'
At the same time, that litigation has spawned a vast and conflicting body of
case law7 and commentary This split of authority led the Supreme Court
4. See Richard A. Booth, The Scope of Section 12(2) After Gustafson, INSIGHTS, July
1995, at 8 (discussing potential implications of Gustafson decision). Booth suggests that the
Gustafson decision has brought into question the availability of § 12(2) in connection with
a wide variety of securities offerings to which most investors previously assumed that the
section applied. Id.
5. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-48 (1994)
(refusing to imply private right of action for aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (establishing uniform federal statute of limitations requiring
plaintiffs to bring § 10(b) claims within one year of discovery of facts establishing violation
or within three years of occurrence of violation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 (1976) (imposing element of scienter for actions under § 10(b)).
6. See Louis Loss, Commentary, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105
HARV. L. REV. 908, 910 (1992) (noting that scienter requirement imposed on § 10(b) actions
prompted increase in §. 12(2) actions); Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for
Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55 ALB. L. RaV. 97, 101-03 (1991) (suggesting that
"pendulum has swung" towards § 12(2) actions because of relative disadvantages of § 10(b)
actions).
7. See, e.g., First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44
(1 lth Cir. 1993) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to secondary market transactions); Pacific
Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding § 12(2)
applicable to initial and secondary market transactions), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146
(1994); Metrodmedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 360 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that courts
consistently have applied § 12(2) to private as well as to public offerings), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2445 (1993); Ryder Int'l Corp. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1530 n.16
(11th Cir. 1991) (noting that Eleventh Circuit did not reach question of scope of § 12(2));
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (concluding that
§ 12(2) applies only to initial stock offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); see also
Therese H. Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. RaV. 817, 820
n.9 (1993) (listing courts that have examined § 12(2) issue); Prentice, supra note 6, at 97,
99 n.14 (1991) (noting cases that discuss applicability of § 12(2)).
8. See generally Louis Loss, Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAW.
47 (1992) (asserting that § 12(2) applies to secondary transactions); Loss, supra note 6
(arguing for broad application of § 12(2)); Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 847 (1991) (proposing availability of § 12(2) for any defrauded
buyer); Prentice, supra note 6 (discussing limitation of § 12(2) remedy to initial distribu-
tions); Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act Section 12(2) as an Aftermarket
Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. LAw. 711 (1992) (asserting that confining § 12(2)
to initial distributions undermines effectiveness of entire statutory scheme of 1933 Act);
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to attempt to clarify the scope of Section 12(2) and the right of rescission
that the Section creates. 9 Using Gustafson as its vehicle, the Court followed
the lead of the Third Circuit and narrowed the definition of prospectus as
it applies to Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 0
This Note undertakes a critical analysis of Gustafson and evaluates the
potential future effects and consequences resulting from the Gustafson
decision. Through an analysis of the principal cases, Part II of this Note
examines the split among the circuits and the reasoning that both sides of
the controversy employ." Part M turns to a detailed examination of the
text of Section 12(2), the contextual role of Section 12(2), and the accompa-
nying legislative history. 2 Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the Justices
in the Gustafson majority and in the dissents. 3 This analysis includes a
critique of the majority's analysis and the result reached.' 4 Part V discusses
the potentially far-reaching implications of the Gustafson decision. 5 Final-
ly, Part VI suggests the need for future remedial action either by Congress 6
or by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 17
Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to
Public Offerings, 48 Bus. LAw. 1 (1992) (arguing that § 12(2) applies only to initial public
offerings).
9. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding § 12(2) applicable to both initial stock offerings and secondary transactions),
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994). The Supreme Court voluntarily dismissed the
Pacific Dunlop case after the parties settled, but subsequently granted a writ of certiorari
in Gustafson. See also Therese H. Maynard, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Supreme Court
to Decide a Section 12(2) Case, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1994, at 33 (suggesting apparent Supreme
Court interest in deciding scope of § 12(2) rescission remedy).
10. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.)
(holding that § 12(2) applies only to initial stock offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820
(1991).
11. See infra notes 18-75 and accompanying text (discussing split between Third and
Seventh Circuits concerning scope of § 12(2) applicability).
12. See infra notes 86-184 and accompanying text (analyzing legislative history of
1933 Act and construing text of § 12(2)).
13. See infra notes 185-248 and accompanying text (summarizing facts and reasoning
of Gustafson opinion).
14. See infra notes 249-303 and accompanying text (performing critical analysis of
Gustafson reasoning).
15. See infra notes 304-78 and accompanying text (suggesting potential implications
and interpretations of Gustafson decision).
16. See infra notes 379-89 and accompanying text (suggesting possible corrective
actions of Congress in response to Gustafson decision).
17. See infra notes 390-94 and accompanying text (providing proposal for responsive
measures by SEC).
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II. Contrasting Approaches Among the Circuits
In determining the parameters of liability under Section 12(2) of the
1933 Act, the Third and Seventh Circuits have reached diametrically
opposed results.18 However, both courts have examined the statutory text,
context, and legislative history of Section 12(2) in arriving at their respec-
tive outcomes.' 9 These conflicting holdings led the Gustafson Court to
attempt to resolve the issue of Section 12(2)'s availability as a rescissionary
remedy.
A. The Rule of Ballay
In Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. ,' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to decide squarely the
issue of whether Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act creates a cause of action for
secondary market transactions.2 In Ballay, investors sued their brokerage
firm, Legg Mason, alleging oral and written misrepresentations about the
book value calculation of shares of the Wickes Company, Inc. (Wickes).'
18. Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that § 12(2) liability extends to cover secondary market transactions),
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994) with Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925
F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (holding that § 12(2) liability extends only to initial public offerings
of securities), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
19. See infra part lI.A-B (providing summaries of Third and Seventh Circuit analyses).
20. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
21. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693 (holding that § 12(2) claims apply only to initial stock
offerings). The SEC provides definitions of terms at issue in Ballay and used throughout
this Note. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5 n.5, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995) (No. 93-404). The
SEC states the relevant definitions as follows:
The [1933] Act does not contain definitions that explicitly distinguish among the
various types of securities transactions that Section 12(2) covers. It is generally
understood, however, that an "initial offering" of securities is a sale of securities
by the issuer and a "secondary" sale is a subsequent transaction. Initial offerings
are, generally speaking, of two types - public and private. An "initial distribu-
tion" is understood to be a public offering of securities by the issuer; a "private
placement" is an issuer's sale of its securities not involving a public offering.
Secondary sales are generally either public resales of stock on organized securi-
ties markets or private resales.
Id. This Note also uses the term "aftermarket" to refer to secondary transactions. This
Note refers to these definitions throughout, but with the understanding that distinctions
between the terms may not always be clear. See infra notes 354-61 and accompanying
text (describing difficulty of distinguishing between private and public offerings of securi-
ties).
22. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 684-85 (alleging misrepresentations about valuation of
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Legg Mason operates as a full-service brokerage house that promotes
investment in undervalued securities.' Through written and oral communi-
cations, Legg Mason estimated the book value of Wickes stock and recom-
mended investment in Wickes based on its alleged future growth potential.2 4
However, Legg Mason erred in its valuation estimates by stating that the
figures excluded any value for goodwill.' Subsequently, the plaintiffs
claimed violations of Section 12(2) based on these misrepresentations of
value. 26
In deciding whether these misrepresentations fell within the parameters
of Section 12(2) coverage, the Third Circuit focused on the plain meaning
of the terms "prospectus" and "oral communication. "27 The court deter-
mined the plain meanings of these terms through noscitur a sociis, the
canon of construction that instructs courts to interpret words in accordance
with the surrounding text.' Based on this analysis, the court decided to
read the two words together as related terms and thus to restrict the defini-
tion of "oral communication" to an oral communication relating to a pro-
spectus. 9 The Ballay court concluded that Congress used the term "pro-
spectus" as a "term of art which describes the transmittal of information
concerning the sale of a security in an initial distribution."" The court
explained that the use of the term "prospectus" in various provisions of the
Wickes stock). According to 41 investors, Legg Mason stated that its analysis of the value
of Wickes stock excluded the value of goodwill. Id. at 685. In fact, Legg Mason's report
of book value, $23.70, did include goodwill. Id. at 686. Legg Mason later acknowledged
its error and corrected its valuation report, but asserted that it had merely made typo-
graphical errors in suggesting that goodwill was excluded from its book value calculations.
Id.
23. Id. at 685.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 685-86.
26. Id. at 686.
27. Id. at 688.
28. See id. (explaining that phrase "noscitur a sociis" means that words are known by
company that they keep (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)));
see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1989) (instructing that courts
should view provisions in light of words that accompany them). The Jarecki Court ex-
plained that courts should apply the canon to avoid giving unintended breadth to acts of
Congress. Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307. The Ballay court used the canon to decide that
Congress did not intend a broad reading of the term "oral communication." See Ballay, 925
F.2d at 688 (explaining that courts must construe prospectus and oral communication as
related terms).
29. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
30. Id.
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1933 Act supported the idea that Congress intended to confine the definition
of the term to documents used in initial offerings of securities.31
The Ballay court then briefly examined the legislative history and
organizational structure of the 1933 Act.32 The court found that, in enact-
ing the 1933 Act, Congress intended to regulate initial offerings.3 The
Third Circuit turned to House Report 85 of the 1933 Act to support its
conclusion regarding congressional intent.' The court relied on the follow-
ing portion of that report:
The bill affects only new offerings of securities sold through the use of
the mails or of instrumentalities of interstate or foreign transportation or
communication. It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities
unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics of a new offering
by reason of the control of the issuer possessed by those responsible for
the offering.35
The final section of the Ballay court's analysis focused on the relation-
ship between Sections 12(2) and 17(a)36 of the 1933 ActY.3  Section 17(a)
makes fraudulent conduct a crime during the offer or sale of securities "by
the use of any means," as opposed to Section 12(2)'s language "by means
31. Id.
32. Id. at 689-90.
33. Id. at 690.
34. Id.
35. HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL SUPERVISION
OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933), reprinted in 2 J.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
item 18, at 5 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 85].
36. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (providing criminal
sanctions for fraud violations of 1933 Act). Section 77q(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
37. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 690-92 (3d Cir.)




of a prospectus."38 The investors in Ballay urged the court to analogize
Section 12(2) to Section 17(a) and consequently, to extend Section 12(2) to
cover both secondary and initial stock distributions. 9 However, the court
of appeals refused to analogize the application of Section 17(a) to Section
12(2). 40 The Third Circuit explained that Section 17(a) contains broader
language than Section 12(2) and thus the reading of Section 17(a) failed to
support a broad interpretation of the parameters of Section 12(2).41 The
Ballay court summarized its decision by stating that the language of the
1933 Act, the legislative history, and the dissimilar language of Sections
12(2) and 17(a) convinced the court that Section 12(2) applies only to initial
offerings.42
Another court of appeals recently followed the Ballay court's reason-
ing43 in First Union Discount Brokerage Services v. Milos.4I In First Union,
the Eleventh Circuit decided that Section 12(2) does not apply to aftermar-
ket transactions.4" Prior to the Ballay decision, the Eleventh Circuit had
38. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994); see Ballay, 925 F.2d
at 690 (describing operation of § 17(a)); cf. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1994).
39. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691 (stating that §§ 12(2) and 17(a) exist as civil and
criminal analogues and that Third Circuit should interpret § 12(2) expansively by analogy
to interpretation of § 17(a)); see also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979)
(expanding scope of § 17(a) to reach secondary market transactions); infra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Naftalin decision).
40. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691 (explaining that language of § 17(a) differs from text
of § 12(2)). The Balay court pointed out that § 17(a) proscribes fraudulent conduct by the
use of any means, either direct or indirect. Id. However, the court concluded that the term
"prospectus or oral communication," found in § 12(2), serves as a limitation on the means
used to commit the fraud for § 12(2) purposes. Id. Thus, the Ballay court refused to
expand § 12(2) to cover trading in secondary markets. Id. at 691-92.
41. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691-92 (refusing to extend reasoning that Supreme Court
used in determining scope of § 17(a) to support broad reading of § 12(2)); see also United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979) (holding that § 17(a) proscribes fraud
during all parts of selling process). Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a) (stating "by the
use of any means") with Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2) (stating "by means of a prospectus
or oral communication"). But see Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d
578, 593 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that Naftalin does not preclude broad interpretation of
§ 12(2) liability), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
42. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693.
43. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text (summarizing Ballay approach to
interpreting parameters of § 12(2)).
44. 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1993).
45. See First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44 (1lth
Cir. 1993) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to secondary market transactions). In First Union,
a discount broker sued its customers, Nick and Catherine Milos, to recover a post-liquida-
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refused to decide the scope of applicability of Section 12(2) actions. ' In
reaching its later decision regarding Section 12(2)'s scope, the First Union
court relied exclusively on the reasoning of the Ballay court and adopted the
Third Circuit's rationale in formulating its holding. I
B. The Seventh Circuit's Textual Analysis
Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co.' provides an opposing ap-
proach to the issue of the scope of Section 12(2)'s applicability.49 In Pacific
Dunlop, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
Section 12(2) applies both to initial offerings and to secondary market trans-
actions."0 In Pacific Dunlop, the plaintiff, Pacific Dunlop, entered into a
stock purchase agreement with GNB Holdings (GNB) and its shareholders,
including Allen & Co.5" The stock purchase agreement represented that
GNB and its subsidiaries had complied with environmental regulations and
did not face any governmental investigations as to environmental compli-
ance.52 In fact, the government had environmental claims pending against
tion debit balance in the Miloses' account following the stock market crash of October 1987.
Id. at 835. The Miloses refused to pay the debt and subsequently filed seven counterclaims
against the broker. Id. at 837. One of their counterclaims alleged that the discount broker
had made material false representations about the status of the Miloses' account. Id. at 840.
The Miloses claimed that the broker overstated the equity percentage in the Miloses' account
and that, as a result, they failed to deposit additional funds into their account. Id. In
dismissing this counterclaim, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Third
Circuit in Ballay. Id. at 842-43. First, the First Union court adopted the Ballay court's
conclusion that § 12(2)'s language limits its scope to initial distributions of securities. Id.
at 843. Next, the Eleventh Circuit decided that the placement of § 12(2) among sections of
the 1933 Act dealing exclusively with initial distributions leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended § 12(2) to be similarly limited in its scope. Id. The court of appeals
then rejected the idea that the Naftalin Court's interpretation of § 17(a) requires an expan-
sive reading of § 12(2). Id. Based on these factors, the First Union court concluded that
§ 12(2) does not apply to aftermarket transactions. Id. at 843-44.
46. See Ryder Int'l v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1530 n.16 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that Eleventh Circuit did not address issue of availability of § 12(2) relief for
aftermarket buyers).
47. First Union, 997 F.2d at 843.
48. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
49. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.
1993) (announcing departure from Ballay in deciding scope of § 12(2) rescission remedy),
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
50. See id. at 594 (holding § 12(2) applicable to both initial and secondary market
transactions).




GNB and its subsidiaries.53 Consequently, Pacific Dunlop sought rescission
of the stock purchase agreement to avoid GNB's environmental liabilities.'
Pacific Dunlop based its rescission claim on the assertion that GNB violated
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act when the company omitted material facts about
its environmental liability from the stock purchase agreement.' 5
In evaluating Pacific Dunlop's claim, the Seventh Circuit began its anal-
ysis with an examination of the conflicting authority on the issue.5 6 How-
ever, the court looked beyond prior case law in formulating its decision.
First, the Seventh Circuit focused on the definition of prospectus in Sec-




56. Id.; see, e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
486 (1989) (avoiding § 12(2) issue by deciding that parties must submit question to arbitra-
tion under prior agreement); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (remanding to
district court which rejected argument that Congress did not intend 1933 Act to apply to
secondary transactions); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d
Cir.) (holding § 12(2) applicable only to initial offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820
(1991); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959) (implying availability of
§ 12(2) claim for case involving unregistered sale of securities); Loss, supra note 6, at 908
(supporting broad interpretation of prospectus for § 12(2) purposes); see also supra notes
20-42 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit approach to deciding scope of
§ 12(2) action).
57. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582-84 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994) (providing 1933 Act definition of prospectus). Section 77b defines
prospectus as follows:
(10) The term "prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale or confirms the sale of any security; except that
(a) a communication sent or given after the effective date of the registration statement
(other than a prospectus permitted under subsection (b) of section 77j of this title) shall
not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved that prior to or at the same time with such
communication a written prospectus meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of
section 77j of this title at the time of such communication was sent or given to the
person to whom the communication was made, and
(b) a notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication in respect of a security
shall not be deemed to be a prospectus if it states from whom a written prospectus
meeting the requirements of section 77j of this title may be obtained and, in addition,
does no more than identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom orders
will be executed, and contain such other information as the Commission, by rules or
regulations deemed necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of investors, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed
therein, may permit.
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the Pacific Dunlop court interpreted the term "prospectus" to include a
contract of sale or any other kind of written communication that disposes
of a security." Accordingly, the court found that the stock purchase
agreement at issue in the case fell within the broad definition of prospectus
offered in Section 2(10)."9 Thus, the Pacific Dunlop court's approach
directly contravened the Ballay court's analysis of Section 12(2)'s text.A
The Pacific Dunlop court next turned to an analysis of the statutory
context in defining prospectus as used in Section 12(2).61 Rejecting the
Third Circuit's view of the context as the overall structure of the 1933
Act,62 the Pacific Dunlop court focused its inquiry of context on the lan-
guage of Section 12 alone. 3 The court noted that the key to defining
prospectus consisted of looking at the substance of the communication
rather than at whether the particular form of communication could be
found on the list of media provided in Section 2(10). 4 The court also
found that the context of the word "prospectus" failed to indicate the
need for any definition of prospectus narrower than the one offered in
Section 2(10).'
Next, the Seventh Circuit examined the legislative history of the 1933
Act and concentrated on the history of Section 12. 6 However, the Pacific
Dunlop court stated that it could rest its decision on its analysis conducted
58. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 583-84 (advancing idea that prospectus includes
any written communication disposing of securities (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
619 F.2d 1222, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980))), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); see also Short
v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1990) (interpreting "prospectus"
to include "materially incorrect or misleading selling literature"), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1250 (1991).
59. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 583-84.
60. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 688 (3d Cir.)
(construing text of § 12(2)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); see also supra notes 27-31
and accompanying text (discussing Ballay analysis of text of § 12(2)).
61. See Pactic Dunlop, 993 F.-2d at 584 (noting that definitional section, § 2, begins
with phrase "when used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires . . ").
62. Cf. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 689 (analyzing structure of 1933 Act as context of
§ 12(2)).
63. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 584-86 (explaining that structure of 1933 Act
cannot qualify as context for definition of prospectus, but noting that structure inquiry would
not require definition narrower than one offered by § 2(10)).
64. Id. at 588.
65. See id. (stating that "we cannot say that the structure of the 1933 Act, the text of
section 12, and in particular the context of the word 'prospectus' in section 12(2), require
a definition of prospectus contrary to the broad definition of section 2(10)").
66. Id. at 588-92.
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up to this point and addressed the issue merely as a means of refuting the
Ballay court's interpretation of the legislative history.67 The Seventh Cir-
cuit pointed out the sparseness of Section 12(2)'s legislative history68 and,
after a lengthy discussion, concluded that the legislative history of the 1933
Act does not require a narrower definition of prospectus than the definition
that Section 2(10) provides. 9
In concluding its analysis, the Pacific Dunlop court examined the
relationship between Sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act.70 The Seventh Circuit found that United States v.
Naftalin71 served as an instructive guide to the statutory construction of Sec-
tion 12 (2).' In Naftalin, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a) applies
broadly to brokers and investors and that, in fact, the Section applies to
every component of the selling process. 3 In its analysis, the Pacific Dun-
67. See id. at 589 (rejecting Ballay's legislative history analysis and noting that
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716, 721 (1993), rejects any reliance on
legislative history for context purposes); see also supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text
(providing Ballay court's interpretation of legislative history of § 12(2)).
68. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 591 (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S.
647, 657 (1986)).
69. 1d. at 592.
70. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (provid-
ing basis for implied private right of action against fraud); infra note 152 (providing full text
of § 10(b)); infra note 153 (providing text of Rule lOb-5); see also Maynard, supra note 7,
at 844 (discussing § 12(2)'s relationship with § 10(b) of 1934 Act and § 17(a) of 1933 Act).
71. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
72. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 593 (examining Naftalin reasoning as means of
determining proper scope of § 12(2)). But see Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
925 F.2d 682, 691-92 (3d Cir.) (finding that language of § 12(2) differs materially from that
of § 17(a) and thus rejecting line of reasoning utilized by Supreme Court in United States
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
73. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979) (holding that § 17(a)
applies to entire selling process). In Naftalin, the defendant investor engaged in a short
selling scheme by placing orders with brokers to sell stock that he did not own. ld. at 769.
The defendant gambled that the price of the stock would decline before the buyers required
him to deliver the stock. Id. The government prosecuted the defendant under § 17(a) of
the 1933 Act. Id. at 770. The Naftalin Court considered the applicability of § 17(a) when
brokers, rather than investors, suffered harm from the defendant's fraudulent actions. Id.
The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress intended to interpret the statutory terms broadly
to encompass the entire selling process. Id. at 773. In examining the legislative history,
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to make investor protection the sole
purpose of the 1933 Act. Id. at 774. The Court explained that achieving a high standard
of business ethics also concerned Congress. Id. at 775. Thus, the Naftalin Court concluded
that Congress was concerned with the welfare of both investors and financial intermediaries
in formulating the 1933 Act. Id. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the defendant's
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lop court concluded that nothing in the relationships among these various
antifraud sections requires a narrower interpretation of prospectus than the
one that Section 2(10) provides.74 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that
Section 12(2) applies to any communication that offers any security for sale
or that confirms the sale of any security whether within an initial or second-
ary market transaction.75
C. Confusion Abounds: Questions Left Unanswered by
the United States Courts of Appeals
Although the conflicting body of case law failed to yield a definitive
answer to the question of the scope of Section 12(2),76 it raised several
interesting questions. First, the courts in Pacific Dunlop and Ballay, the
two leading cases in the lower courts, formulated their holdings around the
distinction between initial stock offerings and secondary market transac-
tions. 7 However, the Gustafson Court framed the issue and its holding in
terms of public versus private agreements. 8 In deciding the future implica-
actions could have harmed other investors if the brokers had suffered insolvency. Id. at
777. Finally, the Naftalin Court explained that although the 1933 Act mainly concerned the
regulation of initial public offerings, Congress intended for § 17(a) to depart from that
primary purpose. Id. at 777-78. To support this assertion, the Court cited the language of
the statutory provision and the Senate report of the 1933 Act. Id. at 778. Consequently,
the Nafta/in Court upheld the defendant's conviction under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Id. at
778-79.
74. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 594; cf. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78 (stating that
§ 17(a) "was meant as a major departure" from general limitation of 1933 Act to new stock
offerings and pointing out that Congress intended § 17(a) to cover any fraudulent scheme).
But see First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843 (11th Cir.
1993) (pointing out that, unlike Naftalin decision, Eleventh Circuit's proposed application
of § 12(2) did not depart drastically from general idea that 1933 Act would regulate new
stock offerings).
75. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 595 (explaining that neither prior case law,
structure of 1933 Act, context of § 12, nor legislative history of 1933 Act defeats or alters
textual clarity of § 2(10)).
76. Compare supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (discussing Pacific Dunlop
court's reasoning) with supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text (providing analysis of
Ballay court).
77. Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that § 12(2) applies to initial offerings and to secondary market transac-
tions), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994) with Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (holding that § 12(2) remedy is limited to initial distribu-
tions), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
78. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1073 (1995) (holding that § 12(2)
applies only to initial public offerings of securities by issuers or controlling shareholders).
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tions of the Gustafson holding, an investigation of the scope of what the
Court decided becomes important.79 Thus, the precise nature of the Gus-
tafson holding is critical in Part IV.D and Part V, which criticize the de-
cision and discuss the potential far-reaching implications of the Gustafson
holding."
Second, these lower court decisions raise issues concerning the proper
approach to and focus of statutory construction.81 Both the Third and
Seventh Circuits acknowledged that courts first must examine the statutory
language when engaging in statutory construction," but these courts dis-
agreed over the proper meaning of the statutory text of Section 12(2).'
Both lower courts looked to the context and structure of the 1933 Act, but
each court defined the context differently.A4 Finally, both courts examined
In reviewing the decisions of the lower courts, the Gustafson Court found that the district
court had concluded that a private sale agreement "cannot be compared to an initial offer-
ing." Id. at 1065; see also Petitioner's Brief at 5, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 106
(1995) (No. 93-404) (stating question presented as "whether Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 extends to a privately negotiated sale of stock").
79. See Booth, supra note 4, at 33 (discussing possibility of courts applying Gustafson
holding broadly as consequence of Court's reasoning). Booth suggests that the Gustafson
decision may preclude the use of the § 12(2) cause of action for offerings that do not require
registration statements, such as certain types of offshore offerings. Id. Prior to the Gus-
tafson holding, one scholar speculated as to how the Court would approach the issue. See
Maynard, supra note 9, at 1 (suggesting that Supreme Court could adopt either narrow or
broad focus in tailoring its decision). Maynard explains that the Court could choose to base
its decision solely on the specific facts of Gustafson by limiting its holding to the application
of § 12(2) for a controlling shareholder's secondary distribution. Id. On the other hand,
Maynard comments that the Court could focus on the larger question of secondary brokerage
transactions, the question the Third Circuit addressed in Ballay. Id.
80. See infra parts IV.D, V (pointing out problems with, and potential implications of,
Gustafson holding).
81. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 687-93 (discussing importance of text, context, and legis-
lative history in construing applicability of § 12(2)); see also First Union Discount Broker-
age Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1993) (following statutory construc-
tion analysis of Ballay court). But see Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582-92 (considering
interpretive role of context and legislative history of § 12(2), but focusing on text as key to
statutory construction).
82. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 687 (3d. Cir.)
(stating that starting point in every case of statutory construction is language of statute
(citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976))), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
820 (1991); see also Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582 (7th
Cir. 1993) (same (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975)), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994)).
83. See supra notes 27-31 (discussing Ballay court's interpretation of text). But see
supra notes 57-60 (explaining Pacific Dunlop court's textual analysis).
84. Compare Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 584-85 (stating that "context" means text
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the legislative history of the 1933 Act and of Section 12(2) in particular,
but each court interpreted and weighed the significance of the legislative
history differently.' Deciding the proper roles of the statutory structure
and legislative history in construing Section 12(2) becomes important in
evaluating the reasoning and result of the Gustafson Court's decision.
IlL Statutory Language, Context, and Legislative History:
Conclusive Guides to Interpretation?
Some securities scholars regard the text of Section 12(2) as a clear and
definitive answer to the question regarding the scope of its applicability.'M
Other courts and commentators have pointed out that courts must go beyond
the text of Section 12(2) and examine the provision in light of its context.'
However, those who advocate analyzing the context disagree about the par-
ameters of the context that courts should consider in determining the availa-
bility of Section 12(2)." Finally, although most agree with the Supreme
of act of Congress surrounding word at issue, and thus is confined here to § 12 of 1933 Act)
with Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690-91 (suggesting review of legislative purpose and structure of
entire 1933 Act as means of putting provision in context).
85. Compare Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 585 (rejecting use of legislative history in
context analysis) with Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690 (quoting H. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1933), as conclusive evidence of congressional intent in creating 1933 Act).
86. See, e.g., 17 J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND LIT-
IGATION UNDER THE 1933 AcT § 6.01[3][C], at 6-26 (1990) (relying on "plain meaning"
argument for defining prospectus broadly). Hicks states that "[i]n the absence of a conflict
between reasonably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute must
prevail." Id. (quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700 (1980)); Loss, supra note 6, at
917 (explaining importance of text in construing scope of § 12(2)); Loss, supra note 8, at
54 (stating that available legislative history is not determinative and that face of statute
provides greater insight to meaning of § 12(2)); Maynard, supra note 8, at 870 (noting that
nothing in statute's text limits § 12(2) rescission remedy to initial distribution transactions).
But see Weiss, supra note 8, at 6 (asserting that analysis of statute's language and grammati-
cal structure fails to allow conclusive determination of which sales of securities are within
scope of § 12(2)).
87. See First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843 (1lth Cir.
1993) (examining relationship of § 12(2) to other sections of 1933 Act); Ballay v. Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689-90 (3d Cir.) (using overall object and
structure of 1933 Act as context), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); see also Prentice,
supra note 6, at 112-14 (examining scope of § 12(2) in light of overall legislative scheme);
Weiss, supra note 8, at 7 (asserting that Supreme Court has relied principally on statutory
context of provision in question to answer interpretive issues in federal securities laws).
88. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 584-85 (7th Cir.
1993) (limiting context analysis to § 12 of 1933 Act only), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146
(1994); Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690-91 (defining context as entire 1933 Act); Weiss, supra note
8, at 9-14 (viewing context as general regulatory scheme of 1933 Act). Weiss examines the
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Court's conclusion that little legislative history of Section 12(2) and the
1933 Act exists,8 9 courts and commentators have accorded the existing leg-
islative history different weights when using it to interpret Section 12(2). 0
A. Analyzing the Text
Section 12(2)'s text states that any person who offers or sells a security
"by means of a prospectus or oral communication" that includes a misstate-
ment or omission of a material fact shall be subject to an action for rescis-
sion or damages.9" The textual issue focuses on the meaning of the phrase
"by means of a prospectus."I The Pacific Dunlop court found the text to
be dispositive in its determination of the parameters of Section 12(2). 93
context of § 12(2) by evaluating how it fits with other provisions of the Act to form a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. Weiss, supra note 8, at 9-14.
89. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657 (1986) (remarking on sparseness
of legislative history of 1933 Act); see also Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 591 (recognizing
sparseness of legislative history in analyzing scope of § 12(2) availability); Prentice, supra
note 6, at 107 (noting that § 12(2) "has no clear lineage" and stating that Congress never
separately analyzed § 12(2) in legislative history of 1933 Act); Joseph E. Reece, Would
Someone Please Tell Me the Definition of the Term 'Seller. The Confusion Surrounding
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 14 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 35, 41 (1989) (pointing out
"lack of enlightenment" in legislative history of § 12(2)).
90. See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 591 (concluding that legislative history is
not dispositive in limiting scope of § 12(2) actions); Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690 (noting clear
intent of Congress to limit 1933 Act to regulation of initial public offerings); Maynard,
supra note 7, at 842 (stating that courts should resolve interpretive issue by tools of statutory
construction rather than by reliance on sparse legislative history). Maynard also points out
that the overall role of legislative history in statutory interpretation continues to be a
controversial subject. Maynard, supra note 7, at 842 n.115 (citing Jerry L. Marshaw,
Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 827, 833 (1991)); see also Kevin N. Peter, Comment, Section 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933: Does it Apply to the Secondary Market? The Circuits are Fighting, 31
HOus. L. REV. 1205, 1229 (1994) (stating that ultimate answer to question of scope of
§ 12(2) must lie somewhere outside of legislative history). Peter asserts that the incredibly
vague legislative history of § 12(2) fails to provide a clear answer to discerning congressio-
nal intent. Peter, supra, at 1229.
91. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994) (providing rescission
remedy for material misstatements or omissions in prospectus); see supra note 2 (providing
full text of § 12(2)).
92. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (1995) (framing issue as
whether private sale agreement constitutes prospectus for § 12(2) purposes). The Court
stated that the parties and courts of appeals had all agreed that the text restricts the definition
of "oral communication" to an oral communication that relates to a prospectus and thus the
real issue involved defining prospectus for purpose of a § 12(2) remedy. 1d.
93. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582-84 (7th Cir.
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Some scholars also have concluded that the text of Section 12(2) answers
the question about the Section's scope of potential liability.'
For example, Professor Louis Loss, a former professor of law at
Harvard Law School and a securities expert,' asserts that at least the text,
if not the "plain meaning," holds the key to resolving the interpretive issue
surrounding the scope of the Section 12(2) rescission remedy. 6 Loss states
that "all one needs to do here is to read the words" to know what Section
12(2) means. 7 However, Loss explains that "language, policy, and style"
all support his broad, literal reading of the text.9s Loss apparently derives
his answer to the question of the scope of Section 12(2) from the text 9 and
argues that policy and other factors do not detract from his conclusion that
Section 12(2) applies to both initial and secondary market transactions."t
In a recent article, Elliott J. Weiss, a law professor at the University
of Arizona,' criticizes the literal approach to defining the scope of pro-
spectus.) 2 Weiss summarizes the literalist view as follows:
(i) Section 12(2) applies to every person who sells a security "by means
of a prospectus or oral communication;"
(ii) Section 2(10) defines prospectus to include every "[written] commu-
nication ... which offers any security for sale;"
(iii) Every sale of securities involves some written or oral communica-
tion, so every sale of securities is covered by section 12(2).13
1993) (emphasizing textual clarity of § 12(2) when read in conjunction with broad definition
of prospectus in § 2(10)), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
94. See infra note 107 (noting advocates of literal approach to interpreting § 12(2)).
95. See Loss, supra note 8, at 47 n.* (identifying Professor Louis Loss).
96. See Loss, supra note 8, at 54 (seeking answer to availability of § 12(2) remedy
for secondary market transactions on face of statute rather than in legislative history).
97. Loss, supra note 6, at 917.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 918 (arguing that text requires broad availability of § 12(2)); see also
Loss, supra note 8, at 54-56 (concluding that statutory text demands application of § 12(2)
to aftermarket trading).
100. See Loss, supra note 8, at 58 (arguing that public policy supports his view). Loss
criticizes the Ballay opinion and the Weiss article for failing to consider the policy implica-
tions of limiting the availability of § 12(2). Id.; see Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (limiting § 12(2) actions to initial distributions), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); Weiss, supra note 8, at 3 (arguing for narrow construction
of § 12(2) right of action).
101. See Weiss, supra note 8, at n.* (identifying Professor Elliott J. Weiss).





Although acknowledging that many courts and scholars have accepted and
continue to accept the literal approach,1°4 Weiss refutes this approach and
adopts what he describes as a functional approach. 5 Weiss bases his
rejection of the literal approach on the premise that the text fails to provide
a conclusive answer, and a need thus exists for examining other factors,
such as the legislative history and the context of the 1933 Act and Section
12(2).116 Advocates of the literal approach argue that a plain reading of the
text indicates that Section 12(2)'s availability extends beyond initial distribu-
tions of securities."° However, scholars and courts that believe the text
104. See id. at 1-2 (acknowledging support of literal approach).
105. See id. at 2-3 (adopting functional approach). Weiss suggests that many scholars
and courts have recently begun to question the literal approach. Id. at 2. Weiss states his
functional point of view as follows: "The Securities Act primarily regulates public offerings
of securities and the phrase 'by means of a prospectus or oral communication' limits the
application of section 12(2) to public offerings." Id. As Weiss points out, this functional
approach focuses on the structure and legislative history of the 1933 Act rather than
emphasizing the text of § 12(2). Id. at 3. Thus, the functional approach examines § 12(2)'s
role in the context of the overall statutory scheme. Id. Weiss endorses this approach and
the result of the Ballay court. Id.; see also Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925
F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (holding § 12(2) applicable only to initial public offerings), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
106. Weiss, supra note 8, at 3.
107. See Adam D. Hirsh, Comment, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act
to the Afiermarket, 57 U. CnI. L. Rv. 955, 962 (1990) (asserting that nothing in statutory
language suggests that liability is restricted to initial distributions). Hirsh's approach differs
somewhat from the approach taken by other literalists. Hirsh says that a prospectus is
associated only with initial offerings, but then goes on to argue that "oral communication"
must add scope to the phrase, or else the term is superfluous. Id. Hirsh argues that Con-
gress would have drafted the provision as "by means of a prospectus or related oral com-
munication" if it intended to limit Section 12(2) only to initial offerings. Id. at 963. How-
ever, this approach is not indicative of most literal approaches. Cf Loss, supra note 6, at
916 (arguing that Congress expressly stated its intention to limit prospectus to document
meeting formal statutory requirements whenever Congress desired such limitation); Loss,
supra note 8, at 51 (same). Loss asserts that even a confirmation (a slip of paper telling the
customer what security has been bought or sold) becomes a prospectus under the broad
definition of prospectus offered in § 2(10). Loss, supra note 6, at 917; see also Maynard,
supra note 8, at 868-69 (noting that nothing in statute's text limits § 12(2) remedy to initial
distributions only); Rapp, supra note 8, at 715 (arguing that language of § 12(2) allows
application to secondary market transactions). Rapp concedes that several provisions of the
1933 Act involving registration statements contain the term "prospectus" but concludes that
the meaning is not so limited for the entire Act. Rapp, supra note 8, at 715. Rapp argues
that the broad definition of "sale" in the 1933 Act supports the view that the term "prospec-
tus" applies to secondary market transactions. Id.; see Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 77b (1994) (defining "sale" to include every contract for sale or disposition of
security or interest in security for value). Section 2 of the 1933 Act states: "The term 'offer
to sell,' 'offer for sale,' or 'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
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fails to provide a conclusive answer to the question of Section 12(2)'s scope
instead turn to an examination of context as a means of attempting to
resolve the issue.108
B. Examining and Defining Context
Courts can view context narrowly or broadly by examining Section "12
solely, the entire 1933 Act, or the relationship between various provisions
of the 1933 Act."° In his functional approach, Professor Weiss suggests
that in determining the scope of Section 12(2), courts must place the
provision in the context of the entire regulatory scheme of the 1933 Act.10
Weiss contends that Section 5 of the 1933 Act,1 which prohibits any sale
of securities without the filing of an effective registration statement, applies
only to initial public offerings of securities." 2 Weiss argues that the broad
language of Section 2(10) provides the definition of prospectus that Section
5 uses in setting forth registration requirements for public offerings."
solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest in a security for value." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b). Rapp argues that this broad definition of sale supports the idea that Congress must
have intended § 12(2) to apply to the entire selling process. Rapp, supra note 8, at 715.
Rapp notes that even beyond this broad definition of sale, the disjunctive phrase "or oral
communication" indicates that § 12(2) applies to secondary market transactions. Id.
108. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 689-90 (noting importance of overall context and structure
of regulatory scheme); see also First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d
835, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1993) (following analysis of Ballay court in examination of § 12(2)
issue); Hirsh, Comment, supra note 107, at 968 (stating that courts should examine
§ 12(2)'s relationship to other remedies in 1933 Act to determine whether provision applies
to secondary transactions); Weiss, supra note 8, at 9 (evaluating statutory context in
determining scope of § 12(2) action).
109. See infra notes 110-61 and accompanying text (discussing different views of
context of § 12(2)).
110. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 7 (stating that key to interpretation requires finding
§ 12(2)'s place within entire regulatory scheme). Weiss adopts Justice Souter's position that
the obligation of the courts is to interpret whole statutes rather than individual sections. Id.
Weiss quotes Justice Souter's statement that "[wle should not be interpreting a statutory
section without looking at the entire statute .... We are trying to come up with statutory
coherence, not with just a bunch of pinpoints in individual sections." Id. (quoting Hearings
on the Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 131
(1990)).
111. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) (stating registration
requirements of 1933 Act); infra note 129 (providing relevant text of § 5).
112. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that § 4 indicates that § 5 registration
requirements apply only to public offerings of securities, and not to private transactions).




Therefore, Weiss asserts that limiting the definition of prospectus to the
context of initial public offerings fits within the regulatory scheme of the
1933 Act.
114
Weiss also examines Section 12(2) in light of the other civil liability
provisions of the 1933 Act.115 Specifically, Weiss views Section 12(2) as
a supplement to Sections 12(1)116 and 11"' of the 1933 Act. 8 He asserts
that Section 12(2) complements Section 12(1) by creating a longer time
period in which to bring suits against sellers who sold securities in unregis-
tered public offerings." 9  In addition, Weiss claims that Section 12(2)
reaches further than Section 11 by creating a remedy against all sellers.
Section 11 does not create any liability against dealers and creates only
limited liability against issuers and underwriters."2 Thus, Weiss concludes
114. See id. at 11-16 (explaining that § 2(10) gives content to § 5 requirements and that
narrow definition of prospectus "fits like a glove" with § 5 registration provisions). Weiss
summarizes the regulatory scheme as follows:
During the pre-filing period, all selling communications, whether written or oral,
are barred. During the waiting period, a seller can transmit a preliminary
prospectus to a prospective purchaser and can communicate orally with a pro-
spective purchaser. Written selling material other than the preliminary prospec-
tus, however, falls within the Securities Act's definition of prospectus, and,
because such material does not meet the requirements of section 10, transmitting
it to a prospective purchaser violates section 5(b)(1). Finally, during the post-
effective period, a seller can continue to communicate orally with a prospective
purchaser and also can engage in "free writing."
Id. Weiss concludes that § 2(10) implicitly limits the definition of prospectus to "written
offer[s] to sell securities in a public offering." Id. at 16. He explains that Congress failed
to make this limitation explicit because its main concern was with the use of "prospectus"
in § 5, which was by definition already limited to initial offerings. Id.
115. See id. at 12-14 (describing role of § 12(2) in light of other civil liability provi-
sions); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (imposing strict
liability for material misstatements in registration statements); Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994) (providing liability for violations of § 5 registration
requirements).
116. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1) (giving rescission remedy against sellers who
violate § 5 registration requirements).
117. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (imposing strict liability on issuers that include
false or misleading statement of material fact in registration statement).
118. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 12-14 (discussing relationship between § 12(2) and
§§ 12(1) and 11 of 1933 Act); see also Prentice, supra note 6, at 113-14 (asserting that
§ 12(2) complements other civil liability provisions by "filling the gaps" to create "consis-
tency and symmetry in the legislative scheme").
119. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that § 12(2), in conjunction with § 13,
allows buyers longer period to discover fraud before statute of limitations bars claim).
120. See id. (discussing limitations on § 11 liability); see also Prentice, supra note 6,
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that interpreting a Section 12(2) prospectus as one concerning only initial
distributions maintains consistency with the other statutory provisions of the
1933 Act."' Weiss views the context of Section 12(2) as the entire regula-
tory scheme of the 1933 Act and concludes that this context indicates that
Section 12(2) regulates only initial public offerings."
A much narrower approach to analyzing context consists of solely
examining the text of Section 12(2) surrounding the word "prospectus."
The Pacific Dunlop decision exemplifies this narrow approach.1 3  For
example, the Pacific Dunlop decision suggests that the text of the act that
surrounds the word at issue serves as the only relevant context for means
of interpretation. 24 The Seventh Circuit derived its definition of context
from the prologue to the definitional section, Section 2, which states, "when
used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires."" The Pacific
Dunlop court acknowledged that courts sometimes may give context a
broader meaning, but explained that a broader definition is not appropriate
in this case."2 Thus, the court restricted its context inquiry to the language
of Section 12 only and remained consistent with its conclusion that the text
alone could resolve the issue of the scope of Section 12(2).127
The Pacific Dunlop court also considered Section 12(2)'s relationship
with Section 12(1)'" and the related Section 5 registration provisions, 29 and
at 113-14 (explaining loopholes in § 11 coverage).
121. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that analysis of all operative provisions
establishes that coherence of regulatory scheme is not distorted by interpreting prospectus
as relating only to public offerings).
122. Id. at 7.
123. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d-578, 585 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating that context is limited to text of act of Congress surrounding word at issue),
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
124. Id.
125. See id. (quoting Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994) (defining
important terms of 1933 Act)).
126. See id. (explaining that if Congress had intended to consider broader scope of
context, then it would have used more expansive phrase in place of context).
127. Id. at 586.
128. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994) (providing rescis-
sion remedy against those who sell or offer to sell securities in violation of § 5 registration
requirements).
129. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) (describing registration
requirements). The relevant portion of § 77e states:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person, directly or indirectly -
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
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concluded that a person may not offer or sell a security by means of a
prospectus without first filing a registration statement. 30 The seeming
implication is that a prospectus cannot exist without a registration state-
ment.' However, the Pacific Dunlop court pointed out that the exempted
classes of securities found in Sections 3132 and 4133 of the 1933 Act refute
this implication. 134 The Pacific Dunlop court concluded that Section 12(2)
applies to a broader range of securities than do Sections 5 and 12(1).135
The court explained that although Section 5 requires a registration statement
prior to a prospectus, the Section provides no assistance in defining a pro-
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose
of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly -
(1) to make use of any means.., to carry or transmit any prospectus relating
to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under
this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 77j of
this title; or
(2) to carry . . . any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after
sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements
of subsection (a) of section 77j of this title.
(c) It shall be unlawful .. . to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security ....
Id.
130. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc., v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 586 (7th Cir.
1993) (examining relationship between §§ 12(1) and 5 of 1933 Act (citing A.C. Frost & Co.
v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1941))), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct.
1146 (1994).
131. Id.
132. Securities Act of 1933 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994) (listing classes of exempted
securities).
133. Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994) (providing list of transactions
exempted from § 5 registration requirements).
134. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 586-87 (explaining that when securities are
exempted under §§ 3 or 4, persons will not face exposure to § 12(1) liability, but concluding
that §§ 3 and 4 do not provide exemption from § 12(2) liability). The Pacific Dunlop court
explained that the text of § 12(2) states that fraud in a prospectus is actionable, whether or
not § 3 exempts the underlying security from registration. Id. at 587. The Pacfic Dunlop
court noted that lower courts have consistently held that § 4 exemptions do not apply to
§ 12(2). Id. Finally, the Pacli Dunlop court argued that to apply the exemptions of §§ 3
and 4 to § 12(2) would erase any distinction between the two different classes of exemptions
and concluded that § 12(2) imposes a broader scope of liability than does § 12(1). Id.
135. Id.
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spectus for means of Section 12(2), and that Sections 5 and 12(1) thus do
not narrow the meaning of prospectus from the broad definition found in
Section 2(10). 136 Accordingly, the court concluded that the relevant con-
text, Sections 5 and 12(1), did not require a definition of prospectus for
Section 12(2) purposes any different than the broad definition offered in
Section 2(10) of the 1933 Act. 137
Another contextual approach to deciding the scope of Section 12(2)
requires an examination of the relationship between Section 12(2) and other
provisions of the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act). 138 For example, securities scholar Therese Maynard asserts that the
relationship between Section 12(2) and Section 17(a)139 offers additional
support for concluding that Section 12(2) applies to secondary market
transactions."' In Naftalin, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a)
applied to any fraudulent scheme and thus to the entire selling process.
1 41
Although the Naftalin Court recognized that Congress intended the 1933
Act primarily to regulate new offerings through specific registration and
disclosure requirements, the Court found that Section 17(a) significantly
departed from these new offering requirements. 42 In one of her articles,
Maynard contends that one should not view Section 17(a) as the only
intended departure. 43 Rather, she suggests that courts should read Section
136. See id. (providing explanation by analogous hypothetical). The Pacific Dunlop
court hypothesized that § 5 states that persons could not carry handguns unless the state
issued them a license. Id. The court then supposed that § 12(2) made it unlawful to kill a
person with a handgun. Id. The court concluded that a person who killed someone using
a handgun would violate § 12(2), regardless of whether that person had a license. Id.
Thus, although § 5 supposes the filing of a registration statement before a prospectus, a
person cannot escape § 12(2) liability merely because he or she has failed to file a registra-
tion statement. Id. In conclusion, the existence of § 5 does not alter the free-standing
offense of § 12(2). Id. Thus, § 5 does not alter the definition of prospectus as used in
§ 12(2).
137. Id.
138. See Maynard, supra note 8, at 882-86 (examining relationship between §§ 12(2)
and 17(a)).
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (criminalizing certain
fraudulent conduct in sales of securities).
140. See Maynard, supra note 8, at 886 (concluding that Naftalin Court's finding
§ 17(a) applicable to postdistribution trading suggests that § 12(2) also covers secondary
market transactions).
141. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979).
142. Id.
143. See Maynard, supra note 8, at 884 (explaining that it is consistent to read §§ 12(2)
and 17(a) as imposing liability in secondary market transactions as long as other require-
ments of provisions are met). Professor Maynard supports this theory with the fact that
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12(2) as analogous to Section 17(a). 11 Maynard concludes that creating a
civil fraud remedy that applies to all securities transactions remains consis-
tent with the overall statutory scheme in the same manner that the criminal
penalty of Section 17(a) applies to all transactions. 45
Professor Louis Loss has endorsed a similar view.'" First, Loss anal-
ogizes by stating that Section 12(2) is to Section 17(a) what Section 12(1)
is to Section 5.47 He considers Section 12(2) to exist as the private ana-
logue of Section 17(a)'s publicly enforced criminal provision.'" He ex-
plains that the fact that Congress failed to repeat either Section 17(a) or
Section 12(2) in the Securities Act of 1934 provides another reason to
extend Section 12(2) to secondary market transactions. 14
Another way of evaluating the relationship between Section 12(2) and
Section 17(a) requires consideration of the alternative means of allowing
private rights of actions for material misstatements or omissions within
secondary transactions. The alternative to a reading of Section 12(2) that
reaches secondary transactions consists of implying a private right of action
under Section 17(a). 5° At least one commentator has suggested that read-
ing Section 12(2) to apply to aftermarket transactions is consistent with the
statutory scheme because this approach is preferable to implying a private
right of action under Section 17(a).15 '
courts have denied civil remedies under § 17(a) based on the idea that Congress provided
these remedies through § 12(2). Id. Thus, she concludes that to deny secondary civil
remedies under § 12(2) would undermine the operation of § 17(a). Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 886.
146. See Loss, supra note 6, at 915-16 (discussing relationship between §§ 12(2) and
17(a)); Loss, supra note 8, at 50 (same).
147. Loss, supra note 6, at 915.
148. Id.
149. See id. (explaining that Congress had no need to repeat these provisions in 1934
Act). Loss states that the alleged dichotomy between the 1933 Act as regulating initial
offerings and the 1934 Act as regulating secondary distributions is not completely accurate
because some overlap exists between the two. Id.
150. See Hirsh, Comment, supra note 107, at 970 (noting trend against implied private
action under § 17(a)). Hirsh suggests that if any issue remains in the 1933 Act that courts
can categorically decide, it is that no implied cause of action exists under § 17(a). Id.
(quoting 5 LouIs Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 896, 977 (1988)).
151. See Hirsh, Comment, supra note 107, at 972 (explaining that if courts implied
cause of action under § 17(a), then courts would have to decide damage remedy, statute of
limitations, any potential defenses, and possibility of punitive damages). Hirsh asserts that
courts would look to other 1933 Act remedies to decide the contours of the new cause of
action and would most probably look to § 12(2). Id. Thus, Hirsh suggests that it makes
more sense to extend § 12(2) to secondary transactions. Id.
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Continuing the contextual analysis, another method of evaluating the
scope of Section 12(2) requires examining its relationship to Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act'52 and the related Rule lOb-5. 53 Rule lOb-5's relevance
arises from the fact that Section 10(b), standing alone, fails to self-
execute." 4 In fact, the limits that courts recently have imposed on the
availability of Section 10(b) actions have accelerated the use of the Section
12(2) remedy and have brought it to the forefront of litigation. 5 ' Professor
Loss explains that the availability of a Section 10(b) action does not dis-
place the need for Section 12(2) in the secondary market context. 56 Loss
152. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (provid-
ing broad remedy against fraudulent schemes in securities transactions). Section 78j(b)
provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
.... ,any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
153. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1994) (providing operative rule of § 10(b) of 1934 Act). Rule lob-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
154. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 387 n.10 (1990) (explaining that § 10(b) fails to
self-execute).
155. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1444 (1994)
(abolishing aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of Securities Act of 1934); Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (refusing to extend § 10(b) cause of action
to breach of director fiduciary duty); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
(1976) (imposing scienter requirement for § 10(b) causes of action); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732 (1975) (limiting class of plaintiffs under § 10(b)).
See generally Prentice, supra note 6 (summarizing reasons for plaintiffs to bring actions
under § 12(2) rather than under § 10(b)).
156. See Loss, supra note 6, at 915-16 (noting inclusion of § 10(b) as "catch-all fraud
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argues that when Congress enacted Section 10(b) in 1934, Congress could
not have anticipated the future adoption of Rule 10b-5 or the recognition of
an implied private right of action under this provision." Loss asserts that
even though some overlap exists between Sections 12(2) and 10(b), this
overlap does not detract from the availability of either provision. 5  An-
other scholar accuses the Ballay court of falling into a "[R]ule 10b-5
trap."159 He explains that courts should not use either section to eviscerate
the availability of the other and that Section 12(2) provides a different
remedy for different claimants than does Section 10(b).1 °  Thus, many
scholars and courts have concluded that interpreting Section 12(2) as
applying to secondary market transactions can be viewed as entirely consis-
tent with the context - regardless of whether that context is viewed as only
the text of Section 12 or as Section 12(2)'s fit within the overall statutory
regulatory scheme.161
C. Evaluating the Legislative History
A remaining approach to deciphering the appropriate scope of a
Section 12(2) action consists of examining the legislative history of the 1933
prophylactic" to provide remedy to defrauded investors whenever more specific sections fail
to provide adequate protection).
157. Id. at 916.
158. See id. (stating that implied remedy under § 10(b) should not stand in way of
§ 12(2)'s express remedy and concluding that neither remedy need "yield to the other"
(citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983))).
159. Rapp, supra note 8, at 725. Rapp explains that the Ballay court and others have
made the mistake of confusing the common-law created § 10(b) action and the express
§ 12(2) action. Id. As judicially created private causes of action, § 10(b) actions differ
from the statutorily prescribed § 12(2) actions. Id.
160. See id. at 726-27 (explaining importance of §- 12(2) availability); see also Hirsh,
Comment, supra note 107, at 974 (distinguishing between purposes of §§ 12(2) and 10(b)).
Hirsh claims that Congress intended for § 10(b) to serve the purpose of deterring insiders
from manipulating the market, and that the purpose of § 12(2) consisted of providing a
remedy against sellers for making material misstatements in prospectuses. Id. Hirsh
states that any overlap between the two is acceptable. Id. Hirsh alleges that it is
preferable to extend § 12(2)'s express remedy rather than to continue to attempt to manage
the "judicial oak" of § 10(b). Id. In conclusion, Hirsh asserts that applying § 12(2) to
secondary transactions does not upset the overall statutory scheme. Id. at 975; see also
Catherine Zucal, Comment, Does Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 Apply to
Secondary Trading?: Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1179, 1184-85 (1991) (discussing different nature of remedies provided by § 12(2) and
§ 10(b)).
161. See supra notes 123-60 and accompanying text (providing arguments that applica-
tion of § 12(2) to secondary transactions maintains consistency with context).
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Act and Section 12(2) in particular. The Supreme Court has characterized
the legislative history of Section 12(2) as sparse.'62 Professor Loss pro-
claims the debate over the legislative history of the 1933 Act a "draw"'63
and admits that the legislative history does not yield a definitive answer to
the proper scope of Section 12(2) actions." Even James M. Landis, one
of the participants in the original drafting of the 1933 Act, classified the
documentation of the legislative history as "scanty."'" At the other ex-
treme, Professor Elliott Weiss claims that the legislative history of the 1933
Act demonstrates that Congress intended Section 12(2) to apply only to
initial public offerings of securities."6
President Franklin Roosevelt's administration spawned the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 as part of the reform legislation of the period. 67 In
fact, Congress enacted the two acts in response to Roosevelt's message
recommending federal supervision of securities in interstate commerce. 68
162. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 667 (1986) (describing sparseness of
legislative history of § 12(2)).
163. See Loss, supra note 8, at 54 (finding potential points of debate for both sides in
examination of legislative history).
164. See. id. at 52 (noting that legislative history is not definitive). Loss asserts that the
contemporaneous views of scholars yield more assistance to interpretation than do the
historical legislative history documents. Id.
165. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 29 & n. 1 (1959) (remarking on scantiness of documentation and
pointing out unreliability of certain sources such as popular articles in contemporary
magazines).
166. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that legislative history supports theory that
§ 12(2) applies only to initial public offerings). Weiss explains that the legislative history
indicates Congress's nearly exclusive concern with public offerings in adopting the 1933
Act. Id. He asserts that Congress intended § 12(2) to maintain consistency with the other
civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act, which relate only to public offerings. Id. Finally,
Weiss claims that the legislative history of the 1933 Act fails to offer any support for an
interpretation of § 12(2) that includes secondary market transactions. Id.; cf. Prentice,
supra note 6, at 105 (remarking that congressional motives for enacting § 12(2) "are as
murky as the motives for enacting section 11 are clear," but agreeing with Weiss that
§ 12(2) applies only to initial public offerings).
167. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 115-17 (discussing reform of Roosevelt era).
168. See President's Message (March 29, 1933), in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2
J. S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 18, at 1-2 (1973) (recommending
federal supervision of interstate commerce securities). The President pointed out that federal
intervention should focus on mandating full disclosure of all important information rather
than on evaluating the merit of individual securities. Id. at 2. President Roosevelt added
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Most scholars agree that, at least initially, the 1933 and 1934 Acts had
distinct purposes. 69 However, some scholars argue that even if Congress
intended different purposes for the 1933 and 1934 Acts, this original intent
does not foreclose the possibility of overlap between the two Acts."17
Courts and commentators on both sides of the controversy about the
parameters of Section 12(2) actions cite various parts of the legislative
history as support for their positions.' Those arguing for a restrictive
reading of Section 12(2) most often point to House Report 85 as support for
their position."' 2 These functionalists focus on a portion of House Report
that the overall purpose of new legislation consisted of protecting investors and that legisla-
don should put the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller of securities. Id.; see also
Weiss, supra note 8, at 17 (asserting that President Roosevelt's message establishes that
Congress directed 1933 Act at problems associated with new issues of securities).
169. See, e.g., Landis, supra note 165, at 36 (asserting that "patent concern" of
Congress in 1933 Act was regulation of initial offerings); Prentice, supra note 6, at 117-18
(noting that Congress originally intended 1933 Act to cover initial distributions and 1934 Act
to cover secondary markets); Weiss, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that Congress was mainly
concerned with new, public issues of stock in 1933 Act); Peter, Comment, supra note 90,
at 1223 (explaining that Congress believed that subsequent legislation, the 1934 Act, would
cover secondary market transactions).
170. See Loss, supra note 8, at 56 (concluding that coexistence of overlapping actions
between 1933 and 1934 Acts fails to demonstrate congressional intent to limit scope of
§ 12(2) action); see also Maynard, supra note 8, at 871-74 (discussing legislative history of
1933 Act). Maynard asserts that the 1933 Act reflected Congress's response to the collapse
of the stock market on October 29, 1929 and to the preceding excesses of the bull market
of the 1920s. Id. at 871-72. She argues that Congress intended to create a new regulatory
structure to prevent future catastrophes and that this structure necessarily contemplated
regulation of both the initial distribution and secondary markets. Id. at 872. Therefore,
Maynard rejects the argument that Congress intended to limit the scope of § 12(2) actions
because of potential future legislation it might enact. Id. at 872-73. Maynard advances the
idea that Congress did intend to limit the registration statement requirements of § 5 to
initial distributions, but did not intend to so limit every provision of the 1933 Act. Id. at
874-75.
171. See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 589-92
(7th Cir. 1993) (offering substantial discussion of legislative history documents), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d
682, 690 (3d Cir.) (relying on House report to support assertion that Congress clearly
intended 1933 Act to regulate only initial offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991);
Maynard, supra note 8, at 871-75 (looking at overall congressional intent); Rapp, supra note
8, at 720-21 (focusing on broad statements of purpose offered by Senate committee in its
report); Weiss, supra note 8, at 17-27 (discussing House report and conference report);
Peter, Comment, supra note 90, at 1224-29 (examining House report, Senate report, and
committee report).
172. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690 (quoting House Report 85 as support of congressional
intention to regulate only initial offerings via 1933 Act); Weiss, supra note 8, at 17-20
(asserting that House Report 85 focuses on new securities issue as 1933 Act area of con-
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85 that states that the bill affects only new offerings and does not affect the
ordinary redistribution of securities except in cases of offerings by a con-
trolling shareholder. 17 Professor Weiss argues that the House Report's
treatment of Section 12(2) demonstrates that Section 12(2) does not apply
to secondary market transactions.174 Weiss concludes that nothing in House
Report 85 supports a more expansive view of the scope of Section 12(2)
actions.175 A review of the legislative history also requires an evaluation
of Senate Report 47.176 The Naftalin Court relied on a portion of Senate
Report 47 in deciding that Section 17(a) extends to fraudulent trading
activity in the secondary markets."7 Although no similar language exists
cern). According to Weiss, the House committee indicated that the overall purpose of the
1933 Act was regulation of initial stock offerings, and consequently the committee had no
need to specify the scope of individual provisions. Weiss, supra note 8, at 18. Weiss
explains that the committee would have then specified any provisions which were designed
to regulate private or secondary offerings. Id. Because the committee made no such speci-
fications, Weiss concludes that the committee did not intend to expand the range of regula-
tion of the 1933 Act outside the initial offerings context. Id.; see also supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text (discussing Ballay court's treatment of legislative history and providing
supporting text from House Report 85).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 35, at 7; see also supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text (providing full quote from relevant portion of House Report 85).
174. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 19-20 (analyzing legislative history of §§ 11 and 12
of 1933 Act). The relevant text of House Report 85 reads as follows: "The committee
emphasizes that these liabilities attach only when there has been an untrue statement of
material fact or an omission to state a material fact in the registration statement or prospec-
tus - the basic information by which the public was solicited." H.R. REP. No. 85, supra
note 35, at 9. The text also mentions that a duty of competence and innocence is thrown
on originators of securities. Id.; see also Landis, supra note 165, at 41 (noting 1933 Act's
concern with initial offerings and public offerings as compared to secondary and private
transactions); cf. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 589 (allowing for reading of House Report
85 which focuses on initial distributions, but pointing to Senate report as contrary evidence);
Peter, Comment, supra note 90, at 1225 (conceding that House Report 85 supports limita-
tion of § 12(2) to initial public offerings).
175. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 20 (suggesting that House Report 85's overall tone,
as well as particular statements, support theory of § 12(2) application only to initial distribu-
tions).
176. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REGULATION OF SECURITIES,
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1933) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 47], reprinted in
2 J.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17, at 1 (1973).
177. See S. REP. No. 47, supra note 176, at 4 (discussing application of § 17(a)). The
relevant portion reads as follows:
The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding securities to the same criminal
penalties and injunctive authority for fraud, deception, or misrepresentation as
in the case of new issues put out after the approval of the act. In other words,
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in Section 12(2)'s sparse legislative history, scholars who analogize the two
sections argue for the same interpretation in deciding the scope of Section
12(2) availability.
7 8
The Pacific Dunlop court cited the Senate version of Section 12(2),
Section 9 of the original Senate bill, as support for a broad application of
Section 12(2). 1 The conference committee's version of the bill"s eventu-
ally became the Securities Act of 1933. The one real distinction between
fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless of
whether the security is old or new, or whether or not it is of the class of securi-
ties exempted under [old] sections 11 or 12.
Id.; see also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979) (relying on above portion
of Senate Report 47 as support for application of § 17(a) to initial distributions and second-
ary trading).
178. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (suggesting §§ 12(2) and 17(a) exist
as civil and criminal analogues); see also Maynard, supra note 8, at 883-85 (concluding that
legislative history of 1933 Act requires same results in determining parameters of §§ 12(2)
and 17(a)); cf Hirsh, Comment, supra note 107, at 967-68 (admitting § 12(2)'s legislative
history fails to offer conclusive evidence about proper scope of provision). Hirsh points out
that the lack of explicit language in § 12(2)'s legislative history fails to create negative
implication that § 12(2) does not apply to secondary trading. Id. at 968. Hirsh concludes
that the legislative history of § 12(2)'s silence on the issue fails to yield a definitive answer
as to scope and that it thus becomes necessary to return to the statute's language and the
nature of its remedy to decide the issue. Id. But see Weiss, supra note 8, at 22 (claiming
that when Senate wanted to regulate secondary trading, as in case of § 17(a), it did so by
express language).
179. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 590 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that Senate version of 1933 Act suggested fraud recovery for sale of any
security), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); see also 77 CONG. REC. 2996-3000
(1933), reprinted in 1 J.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECuRITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECuRITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 8, at 2998
(discussing S. 875, which was Senate version of 1933 Act). The relevant statement from
the Senate version reads as follows:
Every person acquiring any security by reason of any false or deceptive represen-
tation made in the course of or in connection with a sale or offer for sale or
distribution of such securities shall have the right to recover any and all damages
suffered by reason of such acquisition of such securities from the person or
persons signing, issuing, using, or causing, directly or indirectly, such false or
deceptive representation, jointly or severally.
Id. The Pacfic Dunlop court explained that the Senate failed to focus on the term "prospec-
tus" and did not even use the term in the context of §12(2). Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at
591. The court concluded that the Senate treatment is entirely different from that of the
House and supports a broad reading of § 12(2). Id.
180. See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28 (1933) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 152], reprinted in 2 J. S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SEcURnTES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURTIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 19, at 24-29
(1973) (providing conference committee version of 1933 Act).
1069
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1041 (1996)
the House and Senate versions of the bill consisted of different treatment of
exempt securities for Section 12(2) purposes. 'I Courts and commentators
have viewed the House and Senate treatments as supporting both sides of the
controversy. i2 Here, as with all other aspects of the legislative history,
arguments exist on either side of the discussion over the scope of Section
12(2). 3 With viable arguments either for restricting or for expanding the
availability of Section 12(2), the only logical conclusion appears to be that
the legislative history analysis itself fails to yield a conclusive answer about
Section 12(2)'s parameters.
Perhaps the disagreement over the proper roles of text, context, and
legislative history in defining the parameters of the Section 12(2) right of
action led to the Gustafson case. Unfortunately, the Gustafson decision also
may fail to clarify the availability of Section 12(2)'s rescission remedy."S
Although the Gustafson Court considered these same factors in formulating
its analysis, the majority employed entirely new reasoning in arriving at its
result.
IV. An Exposition and Critical Analysis of Gustafson
A. The Facts of Gustafson and Decisions of the Lower Federal Courts
In 1989, petitioners Arthur L. Gustafson, Daniel R. McLean, and Fran-
cis I. Butler (Gustafson) were the sole shareholders of Alloyd, Inc. (Al-
loyd). The respondents, Wind Point Partners (Wind Point), purchased all
of the Alloyd stock from Gustafson by means of a private sales contract. 186
Before the execution of the sales contract, the respondents had evaluated
181. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing difference between House and Senate
treatments). Weiss explains that the House bill applied § 12(2) to all registration-exempt
securities while the Senate bill exempted the same securities from both the registration and
civil liability provision. Id. The conference committee took the middle position of exempting
government and bank issued securities from the reach of § 12(2), but applying § 12(2) to all
other exempt securities. Id.; see also Peter, Comment, supra note 90, at 1215 (reviewing
differences between House and Senate bills).
182. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 23-27 (arguing that conference committee decision to
exempt § 3(a)(2), covering government and bank issued securities, from § 12(2) liability
reflects congressional intent to limit § 12(2) to initial offerings); c. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d
at 592 (asserting that conference report basically follows Senate version of bill that applies to
any sale of security). But see Peter, Comment, supra note 90, at 1229 (claiming that neither
side of argument over import of conference version has clear weight of evidence on their side).
183. See supra part I.C (discussing analysis of legislative history of 1933 Act and
§ 12(2)).
184. See infra part IV.D (providing critical analysis of Gustafson decision).




Alloyd with the assistance of a formal business review prepared by KPMG
Peat Marwick.'" A year-end audit later revealed that Alloyd's actual earn-
ings fell below the estimates that the respondents relied on in formulating the
terms of the sales contract."a Consequently, Wind Point and Alloyd brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
seeking rescission of the sale based on Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. '189
Wind Point asserted that Gustafson had misrepresented Alloyd's financial
condition and that the contract of sale constituted a prospectus for means of
obtaining rescission under Section 12(2). 19 The district court granted Gus-
tafson's motion for summary judgment. 191 The district court relied on Ballay
in deciding that plaintiffs can bring Section 12(2) claims only in the context
of initial public offerings.' 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's order of summary judgment and
remanded the case for reconsideration based on its holding in Pacific Dun-
lop.'93 To resolve the conflict between the Third and Seventh Circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari."4
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,9 framed the determinative
issue as "whether the contract between Alloyd and Gustafson is a 'prospec-
187. Id. at 1064-65.
188. Id. at 1065.
189. Id.
190. Id. It is interesting to note, that under the terms of the sales contract, the buyers
could receive an adjustment for the difference between actual and estimated earnings. Id. In
fact, the defendants remitted the adjusted amount to the plaintiffs. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Although the buyers were the controlling shareholders, the district court
reasoned that a private sale agreement is not within the scope of § 12(2) actions. Id.; see
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.) (holding that § 12(2)
applies only to initial public offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); see also supra
notes 20-42 and accompanying text (discussing Ballay decision).
193. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066; see Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co.,
993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding initial and secondary transactions within scope of
§ 12(2)), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); see also supra notes 48-75 and accompany-
ing text (reviewing Pacific Dunlop decision).
194. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1061.
195. See Supreme Court Limits Liability in Private Securities Sales, 10 LIAB. WK., March
6, 1995, at 10 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy's opinion originally may have been drafted as
dissent which won additional support during draft circulation). The facts that Kennedy would
not have ordinarily been assigned to write the majority opinion and that his opinion frequently
references the dissents are given as support for this theory. Id.
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tus' as the term is used in the 1933 Act." '196 Justice Kennedy explained that
three sections of the 1933 Act were relevant in deciding the question pre-
sented."9 Justice Kennedy began his analysis with the premise that the Court
must construe the word "prospectus" in a way that allows the term to main-
tain a consistent definition throughout the Act.198 A logical search for the
definition of prospectus would begin with Section 2(10), the definitional
provision of the 1933 Act. 99 However, in a surprising move, Justice Ken-
nedy focused immediately on Section 10 of the 1933 Act.' Section 10 sets
out the formal content requirements of a prospectus."' Although Justice
196. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (assuming agreement contained material
misstatements of fact); cf. Petitioner's Brief at 1, Gustafson (No. 93-404) (stating issue as
"whether Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 extends to a privately negotiated sale
of stock"); Respondent's Brief at 1, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995) (No.
93-404) (defining question presented as "whether Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
should be limited to public offerings of stock"); Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at I, Gustafson (No. 93-404) (pre-
senting issue narrowly as "whether Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 is applicable
to a privately negotiated resale of all the stock of a corporation").
197. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (naming §§ 2(10), 10, and 12 of 1933 Act as
necessary sections in defining term "prospectus"); see also supra note 2 (providing full text
of § 12); supra note 57 (providing full text of § 2); infra note 201 (providing relevant text
of § 10).
198. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (asserting Court's duty to construe entire
statutes rather than merely isolated provisions (citing Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707,
713 (1975) and Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974))).
199. See Stephen M. Bainb'idge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson
Debacle, 50 Bus. LAw. 1231, 1235 (1995) (arguing that definitions section presents logical
place to begin inquiry into meaning of prospectus).
200. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
201. Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994). The relevant portion of § 10
provides:
(a) Except to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this subsec-
tion or subsections (c), (d), or (e) of this section -
(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a foreign
government or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information con-
tained in the registration statement...
(4) there may be omitted from any prospectus any of the information required
under this subsection which the Commission may by rules or regulations desig-
nate as not being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
(d) In the exercise of it powers under subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section,
the Commission shall have authority to classify prospectuses according to the
nature and circumstances of their use or the nature of the security, issue, issuer,
or otherwise, and, by rules and regulations and subject to such terms and condi-
tions as it shall specify therein, to prescribe as to each class the form and
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Kennedy admitted that Section 10 fails to define the term "prospectus," he
asserted that Section 10 explains what a prospectus "cannot be" to remain
consistent with the overall regulatory scheme of the 1933 Act.' According
to Justice Kennedy, a prospectus, at a minimum, must contain the informa-
tion required in a registration statement.203 Justice Kennedy concluded that
the term "prospectus" must reflect the same meaning when used in Section
12(2) as it reflects when used in Section 10." Justice Kennedy explained
that Section 10 provides guidance for defining the term "prospectus" consis-
tently throughout the 1933 Act.' However, the logical place for Justice
Kennedy to have found a singular definition for use throughout the Act
would have been in the definitional section. Justice Kennedy cited recent
Supreme Court precedent as support for the proposition that a word should
maintain a consistent meaning throughout an act." 6 Justice Kennedy implied
that the Section 10 definition of prospectus - a document containing the
required registration information - must apply every time the term "prospec-
tus" is used in the 1933 Act.'
By its very language, Section 2(10) seems to suggest that at least two
potential categories of prospectuses exist. s However, Justice Kennedy
contents which it may find appropriate-and consistent with the public interest and
the protection of investors.
Id. The 1933 Act specifically exempts certain classes of securities from its coverage. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994) (providing exempt classes of securities).
202. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (advancing idea that document fails to constitute
prospectus when it does not need to comply with § 10 requirements, unless it falls under § 3
exemption).
203. See id. at 1067 (explaining that only public offerings by issuers or by controlling
shareholders require filing of registration statements and that prospectus, as defined in § 10,
is thus limited to documents relating to initial public offerings).
204. See id. (asserting that Gustafton majority does not use § 10 as definitional section).
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Department of Rev. of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 843, 845
(1994)).
207. See infra notes 268-77 and accompanying text (suggesting potential anomalies
resulting from Gustafson majority's reasoning that § 10 prospectus requirements apply
throughout 1933 Act).
208. See supra note 57 (providing full text of § 2(10)). Section 2(10) begins, "The term
'prospectus' means any prospectus . . . . " Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(10) (1994); see also Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578,
584 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that 1933 Act contemplates several different definitions of
prospectus), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994). The Pacific Dunlop court explained
that § 2(10) offers an overall broad definition of prospectus and that § 10(a) refers to a
distinct document or a prospectus within a prospectus. Id. The court relied on § 10(d) as
support for the idea that the 1933 Act contemplates multiple definitions of prospectus. Id.
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refused to accept that the word "prospectus" could have different meanings
in different sections of the 1933 Act.' Consequently, Justice Kennedy
rejected the plaintiff's argument that Section 2(10) broadly defines prospectus
to include "any communication." 2 10 He argued that the word "communica-
tion," if taken literally as meaning all written communications, would make
the other words of Section 2(10) (notice, circular, advertisement, letter)
superfluous because all the other terms are merely forms of written commu-
nications.21' Almost summarily, Justice Kennedy concluded that the term
"prospectus" means a document used in selling securities to the public. 12 In
explanation, Justice Kennedy relied on the canon of construction noscitur a
sociis,213 meaning that words are known by the company they keep, to ex-
plain that the other words of the Section 2(10) definition refer to documents
of "wide dissemination" and thus refer only to communications directed to
the general public.214
Finally, Justice Kennedy reviewed precedent and legislative history to
find support for his argument that prospectus, as used in Section 12(2), must
have a narrow definition.2 5 Justice Kennedy distinguished the Section 12(2)
issue from the Naftalin decision concerning the scope of Section 17(a).216 He
explained that Section 17(a), the subject of the Naftalin decision, does not
include the term "prospectus" in the statutory text. 217 Justice Kennedy con-
cluded that the absence of the word "prospectus" in Section 17(a) supports
a broad reading of that provision, and thus the presence of the term "pro-
spectus" in Section 12(2) implies a limitation on the applicability of that
provision. 218
The Pacific Dunlop court argued that § 10(d) gives the SEC power to classify prospectuses.
Id. In addition, the introduction to definitional § 2 states, "When used in this subchapter,
unless the context otherwise requires . . . . " See Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(1994) (defining 1933 Act terms). Implicit in the above introduction to § 2 is the idea that
context may require different definitions of prospectus.
209. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068.
210. Id. at 1069.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 28 (explaining noscitur a sociis canon of construction).
214. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070; see also supra note 57 (providing § 2(10) definition
of prospectus).
215. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070-73.
216. Id. at 1070-71; see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing Naftalin
decision).
217. Id. at 1071; see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979) (holding
entire selling process subject to § 17(a)).
218. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071.
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In Part H.D of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy made an abbrevi-
ated policy argument for narrowing the scope of Section 12(2)'s applicabil-
ity.219 He then reviewed selected portions of the legislative history to support
his interpretation of prospectus. ' Justice Kennedy suggested that the fact
that the legislative history lacks an explicit statement creating liability for
private transactions demonstrates more about the proper scope of Section
12(2) than the fact that the legislative history fails to limit Section 12(2)
explicitly to public offerings.21 Finally, the majority summarized its holding
as follows: "The word 'prospectus' is a term of art referring to a document
that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling share-
holder. "I
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Four Justices dissented, with Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg
writing dissenting opinions to criticize both the reasoning and the result of
the majority decision.' Section 2(10) provided the analytical starting point
for the dissenting opinions of both Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg. 224
Each Justice began with the broad definition of prospectus provided by
Section 2(10) and criticized the majority for using Section 10 to give substan-
tive meaning to Section 12(2).' Justice Thomas asserted that Section
2(10)'s inclusion of documents that confirm the sale of any security reflects
Congress's intent to define the term "prospectus" broadly beyond its "ordi-
nary meaning."I Justice Thomas's dissent accused the majority of attempt-
219. See id. (commenting that "it is not plausible to infer that Congress created this
extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary
market").
220. See id. at 1071-73 (focusing on House Report 85).
221. Id. at 1073. But see id. at 1076-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
used precise language when it intended to limit provisions of 1933 Act to public offerings).
Justice Thomas cited § 4 and § 11 as examples of the use of precise, limiting language and
concluded that § 12(2) is notable for its silence. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
223. Id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
Justice Thomas's dissent. Id.; see id. at 1079 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion. Id.
224. Id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1079-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 1074-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting need to use § 2(10) to define
1933 Act rather than using 1933 Act to define § 2(10) prospectus); see also id. at 1080
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority uses backwards reasoning in beginning
analysis with § 10).
226. See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that canon of statutory construction
calling for giving term its ordinary meaning applies only "[i]n the absence of [a statutory]
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ing to create ambiguity that actually does not exist in Section 2(10).' Jus-
tice Thomas asserted that each word in Section 2(10) applies with equal
weight and that, taken together, the words create an exhaustive and broad
definition of prospectus.n8
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that specific sections of the
1933 Act, such as Section 10, require a narrower definition of prospectus
than Section 2(10) provides. 9  However, he pointed out that Congress
intended different definitions of prospectus to be used in different statutory
provisions of the 1933 Act. 0 In Part II of his opinion, Justice Thomas
criticized the majority's reading of the Naftalin decision." Justice Thomas
argued that the majority needed to decide that Section 12(2) reached private
transactions in order to maintain consistency with Naftalin.12  Justice
Thomas's reading of Naftalin suggested that provisions of the 1933 Act apply
to both initial and to secondary stock offerings unless the text of a specific
definition" (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (1994))). Justice Thomas
explained that Congress explicitly defined prospectus in § 2(10) of 1933 Act so no need
exists to look elsewhere for a definition. Id.
227. See id. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that no need exists to apply
noscitur a sociis when no doubt initially exists in statutory provision).
228. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1075-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing § 2 introduction stating that definitions
apply "unless the context otherwise requires" as support for multiple meanings of prospec-
tus). Thomas urged that § 10 is a prime example of a provision where the context requires
a different, narrower reading of prospectus. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
also asserted that using "prospectus" to define prospectus implies at least two different
definitions of the term. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas provided an apt analogy of
the majority's use of § 10:
The majority transforms § 10 into the tail that wags the 1933 Act dog ...
Suppose that the Act regulates cars, and that § 2(10) of the Act defines a "car"
as any car, motorcycle, truck, or trailer. Section 10 of this hypothetical statute
then declares that a car shall have seatbelts, and § 5 states that it is unlawful to
sell cars without seatbelts. Section 12(2) of this Act then creates a cause of
action for misrepresentations that occur during the sale of a car. It is reasonable
to conclude that §§ 5 and 10 apply only to what we ordinarily refer to as "cars,"
because it would be absurd to require motorcycles and trailers to have seatbelts.
But the majority's reasoning would lead to the further conclusion that § 12(2)
does not cover sales of motorcycles, when it is clear that the Act includes such
sales.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1078-79 (Thomas J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768, 778-79 (holding private transactions within coverage of § 17(a)); supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Naftalin decision).
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provision distinguishes between the two types of offerings. 3 In addition,
Justice Thomas asserted that overlap between Section 12(2) and Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act does not imply any limitation on Section 12(2) liability.
2m 4
The final portion of Justice Thomas's dissent, Part III, accused the
majority of letting policy issues dictate its outcome.'3S Justice Thomas
implied that the majority began with the policy objective of decreasing
private securities litigation and worked backwards from this desired result in
formulating its decision."S Justice Thomas acknowledged that reducing
securities litigation is a valid concern, but refuted the majority's method.237
Justice Thomas contended that only Congress has the power to limit the
application of the 1933 Act and that the majority's reasoning frustrated
congressional intent. 23" Justice Thomas argued that the proper role of the
Court is to apply policy rather than to make policy. 39
In many respects, Justice Ginsburg's dissent echoed Justice Thomas's
dissent. 2' Justice Ginsburg also took a literal approach to determining the
scope of Section 12(2) liability.241 Like Justice Thomas, she used the broad
definition of prospectus offered in Section 2(10) to define the parameters of
Section 12(2).242 Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the
same word may have different meanings in different provisions of the same
act.243 Justice Ginsburg suggested that a Section 10 prospectus constitutes a
discrete type of formal prospectus. 2  In Part II of her dissenting opinion,
233. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S.
at 778).
234. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (advancing idea that Congress may not have
anticipated overlap between § 12(2) and § 10(b)). Justice Thomas argued that Congress may
have intended § 12(2) as a fraud-based cause of action for private and secondary sales
because the actual text of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 fail to reach private claims. Id. (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 359 (1991)).
235. Id. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240. Id. 1079-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also joined Justice
Thomas's dissent. Id. at 1074.
241. Id. at 1080-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
243. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (admitting that words are often given same mean-
ing throughout statutes, but asserting that this rule of statutory construction is not absolute
(citing Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))).
244. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg briefly examined the legislative history and prior case law
and concluded that Section 12(2) applies to private resales of securities.245
In so concluding, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that although the courts of
appeals have split on whether Section 12(2) applies to secondary transactions,
the courts consistently have decided that private placements fall within the
scope of Section 12(2).24 Justice Ginsburg followed her conclusion with the
statement: "If adjustment is in order, as the Court's opinion powerfully sug-
gests it is, Congress is equipped to undertake the alteration."'247 This state-
ment and its accompanying footnote 248 demonstrate that Justice Ginsburg
seems to support fully the majority's enunciated policy goal. However, her
dissenting opinion reflects an attempt to remain true to the language of Sec-
tion 12(2) enacted by Congress.
D. The Critique of the Opinions
Securities scholars have extensively criticized the Gustafson decision.249
One scholar accuses the majority of "rearrang[ing] the face of federal securi-
ties law."I'' Another commentator characterizes the decision as a debacle,"'
and the chief supporter of the result reached in Gustafson criticizes the
Court's reasoning as "highly problematic." 2  Results aside, the main con-
troversy centers on Justice Kennedy's method of analysis. 53 Justice Kennedy
245. Id. at 1081-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1082 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1083 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 1083 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Gustafson majority
makes "noteworthy practical and policy points").
249. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1270 (stating that majority opinion "is
at best bizarre and borders on the irresponsibly unintelligible"); Booth, supra note 4, at 8
(claiming that Gustafson decision "rearranged the face of federal securities law"); Roberta
S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1295 (1995)
(asserting that Gustafson Court placed "draconian limitation" on scope of § 12(2)); Elliott
J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions
Remain?, 50 Bus. LAW. 1209, 1210 (1995) (suggesting that Gustafson reasoning is "highly
problematic").
250. Booth, supra note 4, at 8.
251. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1231-32 (characterizing Gustafson as "the most
poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven securities opinion in recent memory").
252. See Weiss, supra note 249, at 1210 (agreeing with Gustafson result, but criticizing
reasoning employed by majority).
253. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
policy goal of majority, but asserting that policy cannot overcome textual analysis); id. at
1083 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (leaving any needed changes to Congress); Bainbridge, supra
note 199, at 1270 (admitting possible merits of Gustafson result, but criticizing majority
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utilized Section 10 of the 1933 Act in forming his definition of prospectus. 254
This technique is unusual for several reasons.' 5 First, when seeking to
define a term, the definitional section of the act in question appears to be the
logical starting point5 6 In addition, the petitioners never even mentioned
Section 10 of the 1933 Act in their briefs. 7 In other words, Justice Ken-
nedy ignored the petitioner's arguments, prior case law, and commentary,
and formulated his own justifications for the result reached. This unexpected
choice of reasoning has drawn criticism even from Professor Weiss, who
agrees with the result in Gustafson. 8 Arguably, Justice Kennedy began with
a specific result in mind and worked backwards.9" The Section 10 prospec-
tus, 260 often characterized as the formal prospectus, clearly reflects a very
restrictive meaning of the term.2" If Justice Kennedy desired to find a nar-
opinion as unintelligible and likely to cause numerous future problems of interpretation).
254. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066-69 (providing Justice Kennedy's analysis of
relevance of § 10 for determining scope of § 12(2) actions); supra part IV.B (discussing
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion).
255. See infra notes 256-77 and accompanying text (explaining why Justice Kennedy's
reasoning is surprising).
256. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1235 (suggesting beginning at definition
section, § 2(10)).
257. See generally Petitioner's Brief, Gustafson (No. 93-404) (failing to mention § 10
of 1933 Act).
258. See Weiss, supra note 249, at 1216 (criticizing majority's approach). Weiss states
that the Gustafson majority decision brings to mind a comment about a different Supreme
Court case. Id. He cites John H. Langbein's comment regarding Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. Id.; see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). "Bruch is such
a crude piece of work that one may well question whether it had the full attention of the
Court. I do not believe that either Justice O'Connor or her colleagues ... would have
uttered such doctrinal hash if they had been seriously engaged in the enterprise." John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SuP. CT. Rv. 207, 228. But see Weiss,
supra note 8, at 1 (arguing for result reached by Gustafson Court).
259. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that policy
preferences motivated Gustafson majority); id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (accusing
majority of backwards reasoning); see also Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 109 HARv. L. REV. 329, 329 (1995) (accusing majority of "profound
inconsistencies that reflect the Court's policy-driven desire to preempt a more extensive use
of section 12(2) . . .).
260. See supra note 201 (providing relevant portion of § 10).
261. See GustQfson, 115 S. Ct. at 1080-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that context
of § 10 requires specific definition of prospectus). Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
Congress clearly contemplated that the § 10 definition of prospectus would be different than
the definition used elsewhere in the 1933 Act. Id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg noted that § 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 distinguishes
between a prospectus for § 10 purposes and a prospectus as used elsewhere in the 1933 Act.
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row definition of prospectus, Section 10 would have emerged as the obvious
choice.62 Apparently, Justice Kennedy ensured his intended result by com-
bining this narrow definition of prospectus with the idea that a term should
maintain the same meaning throughout the 1933 Act. 6 Separately, neither
proposition is troubling. Commentators agree that Section 10 defines pro-
spectus narrowly. 26 Also, the general idea of giving a word a consistent
meaning throughout a statute is not exceptional as a general tool of statutory
construction. 5 However, the point of contention arises from using the
specialized Section 10 definition of prospectus as the controlling definition
throughout the 1933 Act when another obvious and more logical choice
exists.2a5 Justice Kennedy's two arguments combine to achieve his desired
result and to narrow yet another federal securities law cause of action. 7
The dissenters failed to make the responsive argument that Justice
Kennedy's position, when applied, yields ludicrous results." s Section 5
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
262. See Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994) (providing narrow
definition of prospectus); see also supra note 201 (providing relevant text of § 10).
263. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066.
264. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1236 (noting that § 10 contains most restrictive
use of term "prospectus"); Weiss, supra note 8, at 9 (referring to § 10 prospectus as "final,
or statutory, prospectus").
265. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1075-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
presumption that words maintain consistent meaning throughout statutes (citing Brown v.
Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994))). However, Thomas argues that Congress can
overcome this presumption by indicating that it intends a term to have different meanings
within the act. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. See supra note 57 (quoting full text of § 2(10)). Section 2 provides all the
definitions of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994). Section
2 states that its definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires." Id. Consequently,
§ 2 appears to be the clear provision to begin a search for a definition of a specific term.
Cf. Weiss, supra note 8, at 9-16 (using § 2(10) to define prospectus, but asserting that
§ 2(10) contains implicit limitation to public offerings).
267. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994)
(eliminating secondary liability for violations of § 10(b)); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1106-08 (1991) (increasing difficulty of proving causation
element in actions under § 14(a) of 1934 Act); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 648 (1988)
(narrowing definition of "seller" for potential liability under § 12(1)); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (denying existence of implied private right of
action under § 17(a) of 1934 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977)
(refusing to imply private right of action under § 14(e) of 1934 Act); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring knowing or intentional conduct for § 10(b)
actions).
268. See infra notes 269-77 and accompanying text (explaining application of Justice
Kennedy's reasoning to § 5 of 1933 Act); cf. Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 334 (stating
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serves as the linchpin, or "heart," of the 1933 Act. 9 Section 5(b)(1) states
that it is unlawful, during the time between the filing of a registration state-
ment and its effective date, to use a prospectus that fails to meet the require-
ments of Section 10.270 According to Justice Kennedy, if a document is not
required to comply with the requirements of Section 10, then it fails to con-
stitute a prospectus.71 Justice Kennedy's theory implies that if the require-
ments of Section 10 are not met (or at least are not supposed to be met), then
a prospectus cannot exist. 2'
The more logical position is that the Section 2(10) definition of prospec-
tus encompasses a Section 10 prospectus as one discrete type of prospectus
and that Section 5 builds on the broad definition of Section 2(10).273 Under
Justice Kennedy's reasoning, issuers presumably could use any writing in a
registered deal without violating Section 5.274 Consequently, issuers would
avoid any possibility of charges of fraud under Section 12(1).275 Under this
literal reading of Justice Kennedy's opinion, Sections 5 and 12(1) fail to have
any force, and the regulation of registered deals is imperiled. Justice Ken-
nedy asserts that the overriding goal of the entire 1933 Act is to protect
public, registered offerings. 76 However, his reasoning, taken at face value,
tends to undercut the entire regulatory scheme of the 1933 Act.Y Although
that Gustafson decision implies that "no 'prospectus' can exist within the meaning of any
section of the 1933 Act in a transaction exempted by section 4" because document is then
not required to comply with § 10).
269. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (commenting that § 5 serves as
"heart" of 1933 Act).
270. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1994); see supra note 129
(providing text of § 5).
271. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (suggesting that document fails to be prospectus
if it does not fulfill requirements of § 10). Justice Kennedy pointed out that a document
does not fail to be a prospectus merely because it does not contain all the required informa-
tion. Id. at 1067. Instead, Justice Kennedy argued that if a document is not required to
comply with § 10 in the first place, then it ceases to constitute a prospectus. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1241 (explaining that reading §§ 2(10) and 5
together indicates that documents exist that fall within the definition of prospectus, but fail
to require compliance with § 10).
274. See id. at 1259 (explaining that if documents fail to constitute prospectuses, then
no § 5(b)(1) violation possibly can occur).
275. Securities Act'of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994); see also supra note 2
(providing text of § 12). Section 12(1) provides the rescission remedy for violations of § 5
requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1).
276. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070-71.
277. See Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 333-34 (asserting that Gustafson majority's
opinion "seriously undermines the effectiveness and coherence of other provisions of the
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the dissenters failed to point out this flaw, this problematic reasoning seems
to provide ample reason to question Justice Kennedy's analysis - and
possibly his motivations.
It remains unclear why the majority did not simply follow the reasoning
of the Ballay court and rely on the prior arguments about the legislative
history and the structure and purpose of the 1933 Act.27 Instead, Justice
Kennedy focused on his original Section 10 analysis and discussed limited
precedent, legislative history, and other support.279 The Ballay court's
analysis and result also appear inconsistent with the statutory text and con-
gressional intent; however, the Ballay approach presents an academically
defensible position. I
The majority's use of policy arguments raises a question about the
desirability of making interpretive decisions of statutory securities law based
on policy considerations."s Policy goals and ideas change with the composi-
tion of the Court,m yet a conflicting need for stability and consistency exists
[1933] Act").
278. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.)
(reaching Gustafson conclusion that § 12(2) applies only to public offerings), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 820 (1991); see also supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text (discussing Ballay
court's approach to defining scope of § 12(2) actions).
279. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1065-71 (providing reasoning of Gustafson majority).
Justice Kennedy basically relies on House Report 85, the Naftalin decision, and policy
reasons as the only supporting arguments for his narrow interpretation of § 12(2). Id. at
1069-71.
280. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 3 (endorsing Ballay court's approach and result); see
also Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 334 n.50 (commenting that Professor Weiss "presents
the best scholarly argument for a limited reading of section 12(2)" that results in less
damage to regulatory scheme of 1933 Act than "majority's slash and burn expedition
through section 2(10)"); supra notes 20-42 (presenting Ballay court's analysis).
281. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1256 (describing 1933 Act as technical statute
and asserting that interpretations based on policy considerations could destroy operation of
statute); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Curtailing Civil Liability, 213 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20,
1995, at 3 (accusing opinion of being "motivated more by politics than any serious examina-
tion of the statute"); cf. Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 339 (noting that agreement with
majority's policy goal may reduce public and legislative scrutiny, but asserting that decision
creates "threat to legislative supremacy" which outweighs any policy considerations).
282. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1254 (noting that for many years Supreme
Court expanded securities liability through use of implied causes of action, but suggesting
that Court is now moving in opposite direction). Bainbridge states that if the Supreme Court
has changed policy direction, it may be a reflection of the current political atmosphere. Id.
at 1254 n.153. He points to the limitations on securities litigation proposed in the Republi-
can Contract with America. Id. (citing NEwT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
150-51 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds. 1994)); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must
Never Forget That It Is an Inkblot We Are Expounding: Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29
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in this area of the law.'r The Gustafson decision follows a recent trend of
narrowing the scope of federal securities causes of action.' However, the
decision goes further than most recent cases because it involves limiting the
use of an express cause of action rather than narrowing the availability of
implied causes of action.' As the dissenting Justices pointed out, Congress,
rather than courts, should make such policy decisions. 6
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 41, 52-53 (1995) (discussing unusual coalitions of Gustafson decision);
Karmel, supra note 281, at 3 (asserting that Supreme Court is "climb[ing] on the tort reform
bandwagon" by eliminating potential litigation under § 12(2)); Transcript - Panel Exchange,
The Fourth Annual Fritz B. Bums Lecture, Central Bank: The Methodology, The Message,
and the Future, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 73, 80 (1995) [hereinafter Transcript] (comments of
Simon Lome, General Counsel of the SEC) (recognizing Supreme Court hostility to utili-
zation of federal courts by private litigants). Mr. Lome suggests that both the Central Bank
and Gustafson Courts remained true to the policy goal of limiting access of private litigants
to courts in federal securities actions. Id. In addition, Mr. Lome makes the interesting
point that the only recent case where the SEC side prevailed also had the effect of reducing
access to the federal courts in the securities field. Id. at 80 n.31; see also Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1995) (upholding availability of
punitive damages in securities arbitration actions). Mr. Lome suggests that making arbitra-
tion actions more attractive implicitly reduces the use of federal courts. Transcript, supra,
at 80 n.31.
283. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1270 (asserting that "expansive nature of
securities fraud liability" yields corresponding need for certainty and stability).
284. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994)
(holding that no implied private right of action exists for aiding and abetting violations of
§ 10(b) of 1934 Act); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 364 (1991) (establishing federal statute of limitations for § 10(b) claims under 1934
Act); id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing pro-plaintiff position that three year
statute of limitations beginning with occurrence of violation endangered purposes of 1934
Act); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 (1991) (setting
high causation requirement in narrowing implied cause of action for material misstatements
in proxy statements); id. at 1116 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(advancing pro-plaintiff position of lower standards of causation).
285. See Transcript, supra note 282, at 80 (noting Central Bank Court's narrowing of
implied cause of action and Gustafson Court's narrowing of express cause of action).
286. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is for
Congress, and not for this Court, to determine the desired level of securities liability"). As
Justice Thomas pointed out, the Central Bank Court emphasized that policy could not
override textual analysis unless textual analysis produces such bizarre results that Congress
could not possibly have intended them. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Central Bank,
114 S. Ct. at 1442); see also Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1083 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Congress should make needed policy changes). But see Steven Thel,
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv.
1183, 1183 (1995) (advancing idea that Supreme Court should consider policy in determin-
ing scope of § 12(2) action). Professor Thel states that "[tihe Supreme Court ought not
lightly abandon the rule of law; but, when it decides the scope of section 12(2), it should
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Prior to Gustafson, the Supreme Court decided Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank.' In determining the existence of aiding and abetting
liability under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Central Bank Court turned
to the statutory language as the origin of its analysis." Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, construed the text strictly and concluded that the
statute did not encompass aiding and abetting liability because Congress
failed to make these terms explicit in the text of the statute. 289 In fact, the
Central Bank Court relied on the idea that in determining the scope of
liability under provisions of the securities acts, the Court should ascertain
congressional intent by referring to the statute's express language. 290 Based
upon the Central Bank decision, it seemed logical that the Supreme Court
would adopt the reasoning and result of the Pacific Dunlop court, which
focused on a textual analysis.29' In fact, one pre-Gustafson commentator
follow its own judgment of whether it is wise to limit the remedies available in securities
fraud litigation, even if that judgment conflicts with the statute." Id. at 1183-84. The
Supreme Court appears to have followed Professor Thel's advice.
287. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
288. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (finding no
private aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of 1934 Act). Central Bank served as
trustee for a $26 million bond issue used to finance improvements at a residential develop-
ment. Id. at 1443. The bond covenants required the developer to make an annual report
demonstrating continuing compliance with the terms of the bond issue. Id. Central Bank's
in-house appraiser pointed out concerns in the annual report. Id. However, Central Bank,
upon request of the developer, delayed obtaining an outside, independent review of the
report findings. Id. In the meantime, the issuer defaulted on the bonds. Id. Respondents,
purchasers of the bonds, sued Central Bank under § 10(b), claiming that Central Bank was
"secondarily liable" because it had aided and abetted the issuer in committing fraud. Id.
The Central Bank Court acknowledged a prior federal court decision finding that aiding and
abetting liability existed under § 10(b). Id. at 1444. However, the Court explained that the
statutory text controlled the issue. Id. at 1447. The Central Bank Court concluded that the
failure of the text to include aiding and abetting liability definitively resolved the issue. Id.
at 1448. After emphasizing that the language of the statute resolved the case, the Court
stated that if the text had proved inconclusive, then it would have attempted to decide how
the 1934 Congress would have resolved the issue by reviewing express causes of action
under the securities acts. Id. The Central Bank Court inferred that Congress would not
have allowed aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) even if § 10(b) had been created as
an express cause of action because of its failure to allow secondary liability for any other
express provisions. Id. The Court responded at length to various arguments of the petition-
ers and amici. Id. at 1450-55. The Court concluded that the absence of aiding and abetting
liability in the text yielded a conclusive answer to the issue. Id. at 1455. Thus, the Court
found that Central Bank could not be found liable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id.
289. See id. at 1446-48 (noting that text of statute resolved case).
290. Id. at 1447 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988)).
291. See supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of Pacific
Dunlop court); see also Therese H. Maynard, Implications of Central Bank on Gustafson,
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suggested that the Central Bank decision left the Gustafson Court with "no
consistent alternative but to agree with the Seventh Circuit that [S]ection
12(2) relief is available to any defrauded buyer who otherwise satisfies the
statute's prerequisites. "2  In view of the Central Bank precedent, a possi-
ble explanation for Justice Kennedy's reasoning begins to emerge.293 Jus-
tice Kennedy could not adopt the reasoning of the Ballay court and remain
consistent with the majority approach of the Central Bank decision, which
he also authored.2' However, he could not adopt the Pacific Dunlop
position and achieve his desired policy goals.295 To resolve this dilemma,
Justice Kennedy constructed a new textual approach by turning to the text
of Section 10.296 Justice Kennedy's desire for consistency is commend-
able.2" However, his innovative and unsound approach is not.298
212 N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1994, at 5 (arguing that Supreme Court should affirm Pacific Dunlop
holding in order to maintain consistency with Central Bank decision). Maynard argues that
both the Central Bank Court and the Pacific Dunlop court emphasize the use of express
statutory language as the main interpretive tool. Id. She concludes that the Pacific Dunlop
court's plain language approach maintains consistency with the analytical approach of the
Central Bank Court. Id.; cf. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Section 12(2): Private
and Secondary Transactions, 212 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1994, at 5 (predicting that if Supreme
Court reached secondary market issue in Gustafson, it would probably follow analysis
similar to Pacific Dunlop court or Ballay court).
292. Maynard, supra note 291, at 5.
293. See supra part IV.B (discussing reasoning of majority opinion).
294. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text (providing Ballay court's approach);
cf. supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text (explaining Central Bank decision).
295. See supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (discussing Pacific Dunlop court's
reasoning); see also supra notes 281-86 (stating policy goals of Gustafson Court); cf.
Transcript, supra note 282, at 85 (comment of Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg) (emphasiz-
ing importance of judicial sincerity in writing opinions).
296. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's § 10
approach); see also Transcript, supra note 282, at 78 (comment of Simon Lorne, General
Counsel of United States Securities and Exchange Commission) (arguing that Gustafson
majority purports to use literal reading); id. at 86 (comment of Professor Joseph A. Grund-
fest) (noting that both majority and dissents allegedly used literal approach). Professor
Grundfest asserts that both groups of Justices remain true to the text they are using, but that
each group is reading a different version. Id. He draws the analogy that, "One group of
Justices is literally interpreting the Old Testament, and the other is literally interpreting the
New Testament. Each is true and literal to the version of the Book that they are reading
,. . ." Id.
297. But see Transcript, supra note 282, at 78 (comment of Simon Lorne) (asserting
that Justices Scalia and Thomas remained consistent in Central Bank and Gustafson by
adopting literal approaches in both decisions).
298. See supra part IV.D (criticizing majority decision); see also Grundfest, supra note
282, at 61 (advancing strict textualist approach as means of achieving consistency in federal
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Another problem with the majority's opinion is 'that it fails to delineate
clearly the scope of its holding. 2" Although the original briefs framed the
issue as whether Section 12(2) is available for fraud in connection with pri-
vate offerings, the Court requested supplemental briefs on the issue of availa-
bility for secondary market transactions. 3" In addition, the questions in oral
argument often focused on the private placement issue.3°0 However, both the
majority and dissenting opinions seem to use the terms "secondary" and
"private" interchangeably. 3  To determine and to assess the holding, an
examination of the post-Gustafson commentary and district court decisions
follows.303
V. Assessing the Damage: Implications of the Gustafson Decision
A. A Survey of Post-Gustafson Results in the District Courts
Justice Kennedy concluded the majority opinion in Gustafson by stating:
"In sum, the word 'prospectus' is a term of art referring to a document that
describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling share-
holder. ... " However, Justice Kennedy failed to clarify precisely what
he intended to convey through this statement. The post-Gustafson district
court decisions reflect this lack of clarity. 5 The majority of district courts
securities law). Professor Grundfest concedes that a strict textual approach is imperfect, but
argues that it is the "best available organizing principle for a rule of narrow construction that
can end the string of sharply divided securities law decisions recently emanating from the
Supreme Court." Id.
299. See, e.g., Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064 (stating question presented as "whether this
right of rescission extends to a private, secondary transaction . . . "); id. at 1073-74 (holding
that prospectus refers to public offerings of securities by issuer or controlling shareholder); id.
at 1083 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that § 12(2) applies to private resales of
securities); Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1234 (interpreting holding to deny § 12(2) liability
for secondary market transactions); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scope of Section
12(2) After 'Gustafson', 212 N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1995, at 5 (stating that Gustafson holds that
private contracts for sale of securities do not constitute prospectuses under § 12(2)); Weiss,
supra note 249, at 1209 (framing holding as limitation of § 12(2) to public offerings by issuers
and their controlling shareholders).
300. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 32 (requesting parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing issue of § 12(2) application to secondary market transactions).
301. Block & Hoff, supra note 291, at 5.
302. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1362 (noting unclear language in majority opinion
and suggesting slight possibility that unfamiliarity with securities industry may have caused
poor drafting by law clerks or judges).
303. See infra part V (evaluating effects of Gustafson decision).
304. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1073-74 (1995).
305. See, e.g., Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., No. 90 Civ. 2168 (MBM), 1995 WL
498785, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995) (stating that Gustafson Court held that "section 12(2)
1086
A CLOUDY PROSPECTUS
that have addressed Section 12(2) claims after Gustafson have dismissed out-
right plaintiffs' claims based on secondary market trading.3"6 However, the
Gustafson Court described Section 12(2) as applying to "public offerings by
an issuer or its controlling shareholders," which implies that some, although
very few, secondary market transactions remain within the scope of Section
12(2). 0
The question also arises whether plaintiffs can base Section 12(2) claims
on "tracing the purchased shares to an initial public offering. ' 308  Prior to
Gustafson, at least one district court had found Section 12(2) liability when
applies only to public offerings by issuer or controlling shareholder"); Stack v. Lobo, 903 F.
Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Gustafson for proposition that § 12(2) covers only
initial public offerings and does not apply to secondary transactions); Pollack v. Laidlaw
Holdings, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5788 (DLC), 1995 WL 261518, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995)
(relying on Gustafson to limit § 12(2) to public offerings by issuers or controlling sharehold-
ers); cf. Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7581 (RO), 1995 WL
406167, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995) (extending Gustafson holding to exclude private
placements from § 12(2) coverage); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp.,
899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that private placement memoranda do not
constitute prospectuses within § 12(2) following Gustafson decision).
306. See Baxter v. Baron & Co., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 3913 (JGK), 1995 WL 600720, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1995) (dismissing § 12(2) claim with prejudice for failure to state claim
because facts of case involved secondary trading transaction); Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co.,
No. 90 Civ. 2168 (MBM), 1995 WL 498785, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment on § 12(2) claim that involved secondary market
transaction); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5788 (DLC), 1995 WL 261518,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995) (dismissing § 12(2) claims premised on "Portfolio Evaluations
and trade confirmations" after plaintiffs conceded that these written documents could not
constitute prospectuses under Gustafson); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp.
848, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (relying on Gustafson to dismiss for failure to state claim when
§ 12(2) action based on "post-distribution transactions"); cf. Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp.
1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to sue under
§ 12(2)). The Stack court stated that because plaintiffs did not purchase their stock in an initial
public offering, they did not have standing to bring a § 12(2) claim. Stack, 903 F. Supp. at
1375. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that § 4(3)(B) extends the time period of an
initial public offering. Id. Section 4(3)(B) requires a prospectus for aftermarket sales of new
stock within 90 days of an initial public offering. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933
§ 4(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(B) (1994). However, the Stack court concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to allege that they purchased stock in an initial public offering and thus failed
to state a viable § 12(2) claim. Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375.
307. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1074 (1995); see Block & Hoff, supra
note 299, at 5 (arguing that Gustafson Court could not have intended to strip all secondary
transactions from reach of § 12(2)). Block and Hoff explain that because controlling share-
holders must have previously purchased the shares either from the issuer or in secondary
trading, offerings from controlling shareholders are automatically one type of secondary trans-
action. Id.
308. Block & Hoff, supra note 299, at 5.
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the plaintiff could trace the purchase of shares to an initial public offering."
However, in In re Valence Technology Securities Litigation,3"' the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California found that the
Gustafson decision foreclosed the possibility of Section 12(2) claims based
on a tracing theory." The Valence court found that if Section 12(2) applies
only to initial public offerings, then it necessarily applies only to transactions
that require the delivery of a prospectus.31 2 The court stated that Gustafson's
language made the tracing question irrelevant and dismissed the plaintiff's
Section 12(2) claims with prejudice.313 However, other district court deci-
sions have implied the continued availability of the tracing theory.3 14 For
309. See In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that plaintiffs who claim traceability of shares to public offerings have standing to bring
§ 12(2) claims).
310. No. C 95-20459 JW, 1996 WL 37788 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996).
311. See In re Valence Technology See. Litig., No. C 95-20459 JW, 1996 WL 37788,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996) (concluding that whether transaction can be traced to initial
public offerings is irrelevant). The Valence litigation arose as a securities class action brought
by all persons who bought Valence Technology, Inc. (Valence) stock within a specified time
period. Id. at *1. The plaintiff class alleged violations of various fraud provisions of the
securities acts, including § 12(2). Id. Valence engaged in the business of developing and
producing lithium polymer rechargeable batteries to use in consumer electronics, such as
cellular phones. Id. Initially, Valence entered into an acquisition agreement with the Mead
Corporation (Mead) to obtain battery technology with the understanding that Mead could
terminate the agreement if Valence failed to produce the battery by a set date. Id. Valence
subsequently made several public stock offerings, each including a prospectus. Id. However,
Valence failed to meet its deadline with Mead, and its stock price decreased. Id. at *2.
Plaintiffs claimed that Valence committed fraud by misrepresenting the factual reality about
the development of the battery. Id. The district court judge originally denied defendant's
motion to dismiss § 12(2) claims; but reconsidered following the Gustafson decision. Id. at
*3. In the Third Amended Complaint, one plaintiff alleged that, although he did not purchase
his stock during an initial public offering, his purchase was traceable to the initial public
offerings. Id. The Valence court stated that the Gustafson decision limits § 12(2) actions to
initial public offerings which require the delivery of a prospectus. Id. at *3, *4. Accordingly,
the court held that whether a purchase is traceable to an initial public offering is irrelevant,
and dismissed plaintiff's claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id. at *4.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See In re Media Vision Technology Sec. Litig., No. C 94-1015 EFL, 1995 WL
787549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) (stating that discussion in Gustafson implies that
§ 12(2) applies only to public offerings, and not redistributions of securities in secondary
markets even though facts of Gustafson involved private placement). The plaintiffs argued that
§ 4(3)(B) of 1933 Act allows extension of § 12(2) to purchases in connection with initial public
offerings within a 90-day time period. Id. at *2; see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(3)(B), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(3)(B) (1994). The Media Vision court questioned the validity of this theory, but
allowed plaintiffs to submit an amended complaint to re-allege their § 12(2) claim. Media
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example, in In re U.S.A. Classic Securities Litigation,"' a New York district
court held that Section 12(2) does not apply to secondary or aftermarket
transactions." 6 However, the USA Classic court implied the availability of
Section 12(2) liability when a plaintiff could trace a purchase directly to an
initial offering3 17 and concluded that the court did not reach the issue of
"when, in a flurry of transactions, an initial public offering ends and second-
ary market transactions begin."3"8
In a more troubling move, other district courts also have interpreted the
Gustafson decision to eliminate the possibility of Section 12(2) actions with
regard to private placement transactions. 39  As Justice Ginsburg's dissent
Vision, 1995 WL 787549, at *2. However, for an unpublished reason, the parties subse-
quently settled the matter out of court. In re Media Vision Tech. Litig., No. C 94-1015 EFL,
1996 WL 44748, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996); see also Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing failure of plaintiffs to allege facts demonstrating that
purchase of share could be traced to initial public offering); In re U.S.A. Classic See. Litig.,
No. 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL 363841, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (assuming
viability of tracing theory, but declining to reach question of when initial public offerings end
and when secondary transactions begin).
315. No. 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL 363841 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995).
316. See In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL 363841,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (refusing to decide issue of when initial public offering
becomes secondary transaction). USA Classic functioned as a sportswear designer and
manufacturer. Id. at *1. Prior to a public offering beginning in November 1992, defendant
Orbit owned all of the stock of USA Classic. 1d. Plaintiffs purchased USA Classic stock at
various dates between November 20, 1992 and September 22, 1993. Id. On September 23,
1993, USA Classic released its past-year earnings, at a figure below the expected amount. Id.
Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging fraud in connection with the initial public offering. Id.
Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to disclose material facts in the prospectus, as well
as including other false statements. Id. Plaintiffs alleged § 12(2) liability on the basis that the
registration statement and the prospectus contained misstatements of material facts. Id. at *3.
In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs purchased their stock in aftermarket
transactions. Id. The USA Classic court concluded that secondary or aftermarket transactions
are not within the scope of § 12(2). Id. However, the court distinguished the facts from
Gustafson by explaining that a public offering began on November 20, 1992 and that plaintiffs
made subsequent purchases pursuant to the prospectus. Id. The court stated that a viable
§ 12(2) claim existed for plaintiffs who bought stock "pursuant to the Prospectus." Id. (citing
In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) for proposition that
§ 12(2) is not limited to newly registered securities). Therefore, the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the § 12(2) claim. Id. at *6. However, the USA Classic court
left open the issue of when "an initial public offering ends and secondary market transactions
begin." Id. at *3.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7581 (RO), 1995
WL 406167, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995) (holding private placements outside parameters
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indicated,3"° this position overturns years of seemingly settled precedent. 321
In ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay International Corp.,rn the
district court stated that Gustafson decided the issue of which transactions
are exempt from Section 12(2).) z The court concluded that private offering
of § 12(2) coverage). The plaintiff based his § 12(2) claims on a "Final Private Placement
Memorandum" which consisted of 275 pages of material similar to that contained in a
"public offerings prospectus." Id. at *1. The Glamorgan court explained that if a document
is not required to comply with § 10, and does not fall within a § 3 class of exempt securi-
ties, then it fails to constitute a prospectus for purposes of § 12(2). Id. at *2. The court
explained that a transactional exemption under § 4(2) is irrelevant because the Gustafson
Court made clear that only § 3 exemptions matter for § 12(2) purposes. Id. at *3 n.3. The
Glamorgan court dismissed the plaintiffs claims and denied him the right to replead stating
"no matter how the plaintiff might word the claim, the document involved cannot be
'silkenized' into a section 12(2) 'prospectus."' d. at *3 (citing Acito v. Imcera Group,
Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay
Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that private offering
memoranda do not fall within scope of § 12(2) following Gustafson decision).
320. See supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text (providing summary of Justice
Ginsburg's dissent).
321. See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 587 (7th
Cir. 1993) (deciding that § 4 exemptions do not apply to § 12(2) claims), cert. dismissed,
114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 361 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding § 12(2) applicable to private placements), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993);
Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1043 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding § 12(2)
applicable to private stock offerings); Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093,
1099 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that § 4(2) private offering exemption fails to simultaneously
exempt transaction from § 12(2)), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Woodward v. Wright,
266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959) (suggesting applicability of § 12(2) claim to private
offering).
322. 899 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
323. See ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061,
1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to private offering memoranda). In
ESI, the plaintiffs purchased a limited partnership interest in Montenay Montgomery Limited
Partnership (MMLP). Id. at 1061. The plaintiffs' interest in Montenay stemmed from a
letter and two investment memoranda prepared by Salomon Brothers on behalf of Montenay.
Id. After negotiations, ESI entered a purchase agreement for a portion of Montenay's
limited partnership interest in MMLP. Id. Subsequently, ESI brought suit claiming viola-
tions of § 12(2) based on material misrepresentations in the purchase agreement. Id. The
defendants responded that the privately negotiated purchase agreement did not fall within
the coverage of § 12(2). Id. In the meantime, the Gustafson decision overturned the
precedent on which the plaintiffs had relied. Id. at 1064. However, the plaintiffs moved
to amend their complaint to allege fraud in the investment memoranda. Id. The ESI court
stated that the Gustafson Court decided the issue of the scope of § 12(2) coverage with
regard to specified transactions rather than classes of securities. Id. The court concluded
that the plaintiffs had viable § 12(2) claims only if the plaintiffs purchased their partnership
interest within a public offering. Id. at 1065. The ESI court acknowledged that if plaintiffs
had alleged that the transaction stemmed from a public offering, then the court would have
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memoranda cannot fall within the coverage of Section 12(2).124 Part IV.B
discusses the troubling implications of this extension of the Gustafson
holding."-
Recently, the Supreme Court avoided an opportunity to clarify its
Gustafson holding. 6 In Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co.,3 on
remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration based on the Gustafson
decision, the Texas Court of Appeals stated that it originally found that
Section 12(2) reached private, secondary transactions.3u However, the
court asserted that it did not need to consider the effect of Gustafson on the
plaintiff's securities claims because the Texas Securities Act was sufficient
to uphold the original judgment for the plaintiffs. 329 The Anheuser-Busch
court explained that the Texas Securities Act does not contain the language
"by means of a prospectus or oral communication" and thus encompasses
a broader scope of transactions than does Section 12(2).330  The court
concluded that Gustafson did not control its interpretation of the state
statute. This case provided a chance for the Supreme Court to specify
the extent of its holding. The failure to do so leaves many issues unan-
swered. 332  However, the Anheuser-Busch decision demonstrates that
Gustafson fails to impose similar limitations on the availability of state
courts for defrauded plaintiffs.
had to decide how to characterize the transaction. Id. However, plaintiffs conceded that
they relied on "private placement memoranda," but attempted to distinguish between private
purchase agreements and private placement memoranda offering to sell securities. Id. The
ESI court rejected this distinction, denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend, and granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id.
324. Id.
325. See infra part V.B (summarizing potential implications of Gustafson decision).
326. See Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 941 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding § 12(2) applicable to single owner sale of all stock of corporation),
vacated, remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1309 (1995) (mem.). The Supreme Court granted the writ
of certiorari, vacated the judgment below, and remanded to the Court of Appeals of Texas
for reconsideration based on Gustafson. 115 S. Ct. at 1309.
327. No. 05-92-00389-CV, 1996 WL 14061 (Tex. Ct. App., Jan. 12, 1996).
328. See Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co., No. 05-92-00389-CV, 1996 WL
14061, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1996) (upholding judgment for plaintiff based on
Texas Securities Act rather than on Gustafson).
329. Id.
330. Id. at *2.
331. Id. at *3.
332. See infra part V.B (discussing implications of Gustafson and remaining unresolved
questions about scope of § 12(2)).
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B. An Overview of the Potential Implications of Gustafson
Given the presumed goal of decreasing securities litigation in the
federal courts,333 the Gustafson Court failed to employ a method that serves
the majority's desired end. 4 The Gustafson decision creates more ques-
tions than it resolves. 5 In fact, the majority opinion may lead to substan-
tial future litigation attempting to define the remaining scope of Section
12(2).336 In addition, the majority opinion tends to undercut investor pro-
tection against fraud. 7 Although a detailed examination of each potential
implication of Gustafson goes beyond the scope of this Note, this part pro-
vides an overview of the apparent concerns. 8
Although the Gustafson majority did not explicitly remove all private
placements from the coverage of Section 12(2), this possibility arises as a
probable interpretive result of the Gustafson opinion." 9 Section 4(2) of the
1933 Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
333. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text (discussing policy goals of major-
ity).
334. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1270 (suggesting that Gustafson decision creates
uncertainty in areas of settled law and that majority's reasoning merely amplifies that confu-
sion); Bruce Angiolillo, 'Gustafson': Section 12(2) Applies Only to IPOs, 213 N.Y. L.J.,
March 7, 1995, at 1 (accusing Gustafson majority of "impos[ing] additional securities litigation
risks on the capital markets without a compelling justification").
335. See infra part V.B (discussing implications and unresolved issues of Gustafson
decision); see also Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 329 (suggesting that Gustafson Court's
reasoning may produce "severe and unintended consequences").
336. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1270-72 (asserting that Gustafson decision will
require "substantial further litigation" to resolve open issues concerning scope of § 12(2)).
337. See Karmel, supra note 281, at 3 (asserting that Gustafson places severe limits on
investor protection against fraud under 1933 Act by excluding private placements from
protection of § 12(2) and endangers administration of 1933 Act by SEC).
338. See infra notes 339-78 and accompanying text (providing summary of problems
created by Gustafson decision).
339. See, e.g., Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7581 (RO),
1995 WL 406167, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to private
placements); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); see also Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 335 (concluding that all
private placements, including those by initial issuers, have exemption from coverage of
§ 12(2)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate Over
Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143, 1173 n.83, 1177 n.94 (1995) (noting
that Gustafson decision implies that § 12(2) does not apply to private placements); Margaret
A. Bancroft, Responding to Gustafson: Company Registration and a New Negligence Standard,
INSIGHTS, July 1995, at 14 (asserting that Gustafson removes private placements from potential
§ 12(2) liability); Roberta S. Karmel, The Suitability Doctrine, 213 N.Y. L.J., June 15, 1995,
at 3 (stating that Gustafson held § 12(2) inapplicable to private placements); Karmel, supra
note 281, at 3 (explaining that Gustafson removes § 12(2) liability from private placements).
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offering" from Section 5 registration requirements.' The Section 4(2)
exemption has created an expansive private placement market. 31  However,
exemption from registration need not create a corresponding exemption
from the civil liability provisions of the securities acts. 342  The concern
about removing private placements from the parameters of Section 12(2)
stems from a review of the alternative antifraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Although the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 17(a) to
extend to private placement transactions, 3 lower courts have failed to find
an implied private right of action to enforce Section 17(a). 3 4 The Supreme
Court to date has not addressed the issue for Section 17(a) purposes, but
some cases suggest the disinclination of the Court to find the existence of
an implied private right of action.345
Clearly, civil fraud liability under Section 11 fails to extend to private
placements because private placements do not require registration state-
ments.3" Thus, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act emerges as the only alterna-
tive civil liability provision available to private placement investors . One
340. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994) (exempting specified
transactions from registration requirements).
341. See Karmel, supra note 339, at 3 (stating that "huge private placement market" has
resulted from § 4(2)).
342. See id. (noting that it is "axiomatic" that exemptions from registration do not also
create exemptions from civil fraud liability provisions).
343. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1979) (holding that § 17(a)
applies to all sales of securities).
344. See Karmel, supra note 339, at 3 (providing summary of courts that have found that
no private implied cause of action exists under § 17(a)); see also supra notes 138-51 and
accompanying text (discussing relationship of § 17(a) to § 12(2)).
345. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (holding that no
implied private right of action exists under § 17(a) of 1934 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (refusing to imply private right of action under § 14(e) of 1934 Act);
H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions
in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 506, 574-75 (1986) (commenting
on Supreme Court's increased reluctance to imply remedies in absence of explicit statutory
language).
346. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (providing strict liability for
material omissions or misstatements within registration statements).
347. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (providing
general civil remedy against securities fraud); see also Karmel, supra note 249, at 1290
(suggesting that investors may be limited to implied causes of action under § 10(h)); Robert B.
Robbins, Due Diligence in Private Placement Offerings, 28 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.
109, 110 (1995) (noting that post-Gustafson, private placement purchasers can only turn to
§ 10(b) to seek redress for fraud); supra notes 152 and 153 (providing text of § 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5). Robbins notes that § 10(b) requires intentional fraudulent statements, and thus,
no remedy exists for negligent misstatements in private placements. Robbins, supra, at 110.
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problem with using Section 10(b) lies in its scienter requirement.34' The
scienter requirement and other court-imposed limits on Section 10(b) actions
decrease the possibility of recovery for fraudulent misstatements in private
placements via claims under Section 10(b). 349 In addition, one must ques-
tion the logic of relegating defrauded investors to an implied private right
of action that Congress arguably never intended to exist.35 In fact, one
securities scholar has suggested that, starting with a "clean slate," it seems
unlikely that the Court would find an implied cause of action under Section
10(b).351 Query, therefore, where defrauded investors would turn for re-
dress of fraudulent acts. The danger of the Gustafson decision arises from
the fact that it increases the incentive to use private placements for raising
capital by stripping away any real threat of liability for negligent misstate-
ments within these offerings. 35' This result tends to compromise the integ-
348. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (imposing scienter
requirement on § 10(b) actions).
349. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1444 (1994)
(abolishing § 10(b) liability for aiding and abetting); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 225-37 (1980) (rejecting § 10(b) conviction based on idea that courts cannot impose
liability for silence and thus no general duty of disclosure exists); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (finding that § 10(b) did not apply to corporate directors'
breach of fiduciary duty and expressing idea that issue fell under state corporation law rather
than federal securities law); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 189 (requiring proof of scienter for
§ 10(b) claims); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(limiting class of plaintiffs who can bring suit under § 10(b)).
350. See Grundfest, supra note 282, at 44 (asserting that Congress and SEC never
intended to create private right of action under § 10(b)); see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 196 (stating that § 10(b) "does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its
violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission [SEC] when adopting
Rule lOb-5, contemplated such a remedy"); Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1255 (suggesting
that it "flouts Congress' right to make the law" to prevent express cause of action from
reaching "its intended target" because broad interpretation would conflict with "subsequently
created implied private right of action"). Bainbridge adds that the "Supreme Court's
illegitimate creation of implied rights of action should not be used to justify a misinterpreta-
tion of an express right of action." Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1255-56 n.159. He
concludes that "two wrongs don't make a right." Id.
351. See Grundfest, supra note 282, at 57 (stating that it is "improbable in the extreme"
that Supreme Court of today would uphold implied § 10(b) right of action); see also Joseph
A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 986-89 (suggesting that it appears unlikely
that today's Court would imply private right of action under § 10(b)).
352. See Bancroft, supra note 339, at 14 (explaining that Gustafson removes private
placements from § 12(2) during time of expanded use of private placements); cf. Karmel,
supra note 281, at 3 (arguing that breadth of private placement market reflects buyers'
assumption that private transactions are not exempt from antifraud provisions). Karmel
asserts that a "predicate" for the existence of the private placement market is an assumption
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rity of the entire disclosure scheme of the 1933 Act. 3
In addition, the Gustafson opinion creates additional definitional and
line-drawing problems. As discussed previously, the Gustafson decision
apparently removes transactions that are exempt under Section 4(2) from
the coverage of Section 12(2).3' Section 4(2) exempts from registration
transactions by issuers "not involving any public offering."355 Section 4(2)
presents the problem of distinguishing between a public offering and a
private offering. Although Section 4(2) has generated complicated case
law, 356 the general standard emerges that private offerings consist of offer-
ings made to offerees who have the ability to "fend for themselves" and
who have access to information similar to that required in a registration
statement. 7 This analytical method focuses on the characteristics of the
by buyers that sellers will provide "truthful equivalent information about an issuer's business
and financial condition." Id.
353. See Bancroft, supra note 339, at 14 (asserting that Gustafson removes threat of
liability for negligent misstatements in private placements). Bancroft explains that the
decreased threat of liability will lead to increased use of private placements. Id. Shc
concludes that the effect is to dismiss the securities acts as irrelevant, which compromises
the integrity of the 1933 Act and its disclosure scheme. Id.
354. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (discussing fact that Gustafson
decision implies end of § 12(2) liability for private placement transactions).
355. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
356. See Weiss, supra note 249, at 1221 (commenting on complexity of § 4(2) case
law).
357. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953) (establishing "fend
for themselves" test for distinguishing between private and public offerings); Ted J. Fiflis,
Significant Securities Law Decisions of the Past Year as of June 14, 1995, A.L.I.-A.B.A.
(1995), available in Westlaw File No. CA36 ALI-ABA 51 (suggesting application of Ralston
Purina test to decide whether transaction qualifies as private offering); Weiss, supra note
249, at 1222 (listing Ralston Purina qualifications of private offerings). According to
Weiss, a § 4(2) private offering requires that all offerees -
(i) be financially sophisticated
(ii) be able to assume the risk of loss
(iii) have access to the kind of information they would receive in a registration statement.
Id. See generally Carl W. Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REv.
SEc. REG. 869 (1981) (reviewing and discussing uncertainty of common-law private offering
criteria). But see Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1266-67 (asserting that Ralston Purina
"common-law" standard does not necessarily provide correct analysis for forming distinction
between private and public offerings). Bainbridge criticizes Weiss's suggestion that any
transaction not qualifying for an exemption under § 4(2) is automatically a public offering.
Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1266; see Weiss, supra note 249, at 1226. Bainbridge
asserts that although transactions exempt under § 4(2) cannot constitute public offerings, it
does not necessarily follow that non-exempt transactions are necessarily public offerings.
Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1266. Bainbridge points to specific securities offerings which
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offerees, rather than on the quantity of offerees involved." 8 However, the
Gustafson majority demonstrated a different understanding of the term
"public offering."359 The Gustafson Court focused on offerings made to the
public at large and emphasized that prospectuses are "documents of wide
dissemination." 3" As a net result, courts may apply Section 12(2) to public
offerings that look to the layperson like private offerings.36 Again, the
Gustafson decision further fails to create stability and certainty or to reduce
federal securities litigation.
The Gustafson decision also creates uncertainty about the scope of
Section 11 of the 1933 Act. Section 11 serves as a civil liability provision
imposing strict liability for material misstatements or omissions in the
registration statement." The Gustafson opinion suggests that Section 11
liability no longer may exist for secondary market transactions.3 3 Again,
exemplify the flaws in this allegedly artificial distinction. Id. at 1267. He argues that the
coverage of § 12(2) should not "turn on the arcane and ambiguous requirements of section
4(2)," and suggests that exemption from registration should not be the primary factor in
determining civil liability exposure. Id. However, Bainbridge concedes that no other
readily available definition of public offering currently exists, and that consequently the
Ralston Purina common-law standard "might prevail, but it will do so only by default." Id.
358. See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125 (stating that "the statute would seem to apply
to a 'public offering' whether to few or many"); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) (invoking Ralston Purina standard
to establish public offering when only four offerees existed).
359. See Fiflis, supra note 357, at 66 (stating that Gustafson majority did not use
Ralston Purina as standard for determining existence of public offering).
360. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1995); see Fiflis, supra note
357, at 66 (reading Gustafson majority to focus on quantity of offerees involved and "pub-
lic" nature of offering). Professor Fiflis suggests that this "naivete about the concept of a
public offering is the insecure foundation of the [Gustafson] Court's opinion." Id. He
predicts that the Supreme Court may overrule Ralston Purina and establish its own quantita-
tive definition of public offering in order to further its policy goals, thereby adding "further
insult to legislative intent." Id.; see also Weiss, supra note 249, at 1222 n.88 (suggesting
that Supreme Court, acting on same policy concerns enunciated in Gustafson, may recon-
sider Ralston Purina and rework distinction between public and private offerings).
361. See Fiflis, supra note 357, at 67 (pointing out potential surprise to litigants when
courts apply § 12(2) to cases which look to "uninitiated" like private offerings). Fiflis
suggests that further litigation will be required to resolve this issue. Id.
362. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (imposing strict liability for
material misstatements or omissions in registration statements).
363. See Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76 (1995) (holding that Gustafson
applies with equal force to § 11 claims so as to preclude liability under § 11 for secondary
transactions); Karmel, supra note 249, at 1291 (suggesting that Gustafson decision creates
questions about scope of liability under § 11); Karmel, supra note 339, at 3 (same); see also
Judith Welcom & Elizabeth Lynch, After 'Gustafson' Does Section 11 Apply Only to IPOs?,
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narrowing the scope of Section 11 liability would relegate defrauded inves-
tors to the Section 10(b) implied cause of action, triggering the same
concerns previously discussed with regard to Section 12(2).11
In addition, the Gustafson decision generates implications for the status
of transactions that fall within the SEC's safe harbor rules.36 The most
common of these transactions concerns Regulation D3" and Rules 144 and
144A.367 The Preliminary Note of Regulation D expressly states that
although the offerings receive exemption from registration requirements, the
offerings do not gain exemption from the federal civil liability provisions
of the securities laws.36 This statement reflects the SEC's assumption that
all Regulation D offerings fall within the coverage of Section 12(2).369
However, the Gustafson decision endangers the validity of this assumption.
The result is that Section 12(2) may apply to some Regulation D offerings
and not to others depending on whether the offering has the characteristics
of a public or of a private offering.370
213 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1995, at 1, 4 (discussing Gustafson ramifications for future of § 11
of 1933 Act).
364. See supra notes 348-54 and accompanying text (discussing problems with relegat-
ing defrauded investors to § 10(b)).
365. See Angiolillo, supra note 334, at 1 (noting that Gustafson decision will create
debate over many safe harbor transactions); see also Weiss, supra note 249, at 1220-21
(noting complex implications of Gustafson on SEC safe harbor transactions). Weiss explains
that § 19(a) of the 1933 Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules which exempt specified
securities and transactions from other sections of the Act. Id. In effect, these rules create
a safe harbor by disallowing liability for persons who engage in transactions according to
a safe harbor rule. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994)
(providing SEC authority to issue safe harbor rules).
366. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to 230.508 (1995) (exempting offerings of limited dollar
value or limited number of purchasers from registration requirements).
367. See id. §§ 230.144, 230.144A (facilitating subsequent distributions of unregistered
securities).
368. Id. §§ 230.501 to 230.508 (Preliminary Note 1).
369. See Weiss, supra note 249, at 1223 (stating that when SEC promulgated Regula-
tion D it believed that § 12(2) would cover all of these offerings).
370. See id. (finding that § 12(2) applies only to some Regulation D offerings). Weiss
suggests that the SEC cannot restore § 12(2) liability to all Regulation D offerings. Id. He
asserts that if the SEC desires a consistent standard of liability for all Regulation D offer-
ings, then its only alternative is to exempt all Regulation D offerings from registration
requirements and § 12(2). Id. However, this is unlikely given that the SEC supported
broad availability of § 12(2) in the Gustafson case. But see Bainbridge, supra note 199, at
1266 (discussing status of Regulation D offerings following Gustafson decision). Although
Bainbridge agrees with Weiss that Gustafson causes only some Regulation D offerings to be
within the scope of § 12(2), he predicts the result will be the need for case-by-case analysis
of unregistered transactions. Id.
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Similar questions now exist about whether Section 12(2) covers Rule
144 and 144A transactions." 1 At least one scholar has argued that these
transactions consist of secondary trading transactions and thus fall outside
the parameters of Section 12(2)." 7 Additional implications of the Gustafson
decision include the resulting uncertainty as to the interpretation of similar
state law provisions," the interference with Section 5(b)(1) discussed
previously,374 and the creation of doubts about the status of various other
types of securities transactions. 5
The Gustafson opinion has created more questions than it has an-
swered. One probable outcome is that courts will need to employ case-by-
case analysis. 376  Case-by-case analysis deprives securities issuers and
attorneys of reliability and certainty.3" In addition, the Gustafson decision
will require substantial future litigation to resolve specific issues.378 Using
the common-law technique of adjudication to distinguish the case at issue
from precedent may provide the only method available to plaintiffs in an
attempt to salvage any remaining coverage under Section 12(2).
371. See Fiflis, supra note 357, at 70 (stating that under "face value" reading of
Gustafson, § 12(2) applies to offerings under Rule 144). But see Weiss, supra note 249, at
1224 (arguing that Rule 144 and 144A transactions involve secondary trading and thus fall
outside scope of § 12(2)).
372. See Weiss, supra note 249, at 1224-25 (asserting that Rule 144 and 144A offerings
are not subject to § 12(2) liability).
373. See Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co., No. 05-92-00389-CV, 1996 WL
14061, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1996) (finding that Gustafson does not control
interpretation of Texas Securities Act because of differences in language); see also Fiflis,
supra note 357, at 72 (noting potential effect of Gustafson on state law remedies).
374. See Civil Liability, supra note 259, at 334 (discussing Gustafson impact on
operation of § 5(b)(1)); see also supra notes 268-77 and accompanying text (pointing out
§ 5(b)(1) issue as flaw in Gustafson majority's analysis).
375. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1257-69 (discussing status of various § 3
exempt securities, effect on meaning of "oral communications in § 12(2), and other implica-
tions of Gustafson decision); Booth, supra note 4, at 8 (commenting on specific effects of
Gustafson on exempt and offshore offerings); Fiflis, supra note 357, at 66-72 (providing
general discussion of "real world implications of Gustafson"); Weiss, supra note 249, at
1225-29 (suggesting that Gustafson opinion left open several important questions about
applicability of § 12(2)).
376. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1268 (predicting need for case-by-case analysis
to resolve issues left open by Gustafson Court).
377. See id. (noting that lack of certainty will arise as to transactions because of possi-
bility that, through hindsight, courts will decide transaction involved public offering).
378. See id. at 1271 (pointing out that Gustafson will necessitate "substantial future
litigation" to resolve many questions it created).
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V. Living in a Post-Gustafson World: Proposals for Action
A. Legislative Clarification
Prior to 1995, suggesting remedial legislative action as a response to
Gustafson may have drawn little attention as a viable proposal 9.37  However,
the current legislative interest in federal securities law reform reflects a
more receptive climate to such a possibility. ° One scholar has suggested
that Gustafson provides new evidence of the need for rejuvenation of the
federal securities laws.3  More specifically, another commentator has
enunciated the need for a legislative reversal of the Gustafson decision."
In effect, a legislative reversal of Gustafson would require restoration of
Section 12(2) liability, at least to all private securities offerings.3
Although Congress failed to address the Gustafson issue in the recently
enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,11 a simple
amendment to the 1933 Act could restore the full scope of Section 12(2)
coverage. In fact, Congress already has heard testimony about the need for
legislative action in response to the Gustafson decision. 31 Legislative
379. See Coffee, supra note 339, at 1145 (explaining that statutory structure of federal
securities laws has not undergone significant change since its inception). Coffee also points
out the proposal of the Federal Securities Code, at which Congress "essentially yawned."
Id. See generally AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980) (exempli-
fying attempt to combine six existing federal securities statutes into one comprehensive code
under direction of Louis Loss).
380. See Mark H. Anderson, Republicans in the House Begin Push to Overhaul U.S.
Securities Laws, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at A2 (announcing introduction of securities
reform bill by Representative Jack Fields, Chairman of House Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance).
381. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1269 (asserting that Gustafson lends "new
impetus" to congressional review of various civil liability provisions of federal securities
acts).
382. See Coffee, supra note 339, at 1187 n.116 (suggesting need for legislative reversal
of Gustafson).
383. See id. at 1187 (advocating restoration of § 12(2) liability to all private market
offerings and to all offering material by issuers).
384. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (enacting reforms to
federal securities acts).
385. See Sensible Deregulation: Hearings on H.R. 1058 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), available in Westlaw, File No. 1995 WL 703417 (F.D.C.H.) (prepared testimony
of John C. Coffee, Jr.) (urging Congress to restore § 12(2) coverage to private placements).
Although Coffee discusses the overall need for deregulation, he asserts that Congress should
reinstate full liability under § 12(2). Coffee points out that a uniform standard of liability
is needed in order to avoid a disincentive to register offerings. Id. Coffee also notes that
60 years of precedent support § 12(2) liability for private placements. Id.
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reversal serves as the preferred solution to eradicate the damage of the
Gustafson decision." 6 The clearest way to restore Section 12(2) to its
intended parameters involves a simple clarification in the language of
Section 12 (2).31 The relevant portion of the amended Section 12(2) would
read as follows:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions
of Section 77c of this title other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of
said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of
a prospectus (as defined in section 77b(10) of this title) or oral communi-
cation, ...
Adding the parenthetical reference after the term "prospectus" clearly
indicates that the broad Section 2(10) definition of prospectus applies for
purposes of Section 12(2).388 This proposed amendment to Section 12(2)
serves to clarify the text of Section 12(2) rather than to change its original
meaning. By merely re-emphasizing what should be clear from the original
statutory text, this change remains consistent with the textual analysis of the
Pacific Dunlop court and the suggested literal approach of Professor
Loss.389 Congress should adopt this amendment to Section 12(2) and
restore Section 12(2) to its intended parameters.
B. SEC Mitigation
Although legislation provides the only opportunity to reinstate Section
12(2) liability completely, intense SEC involvement provides a chance at
least to mitigate the damage that the Gustafson decision created. Immedi-
ately prior to the Gustafson decision, the SEC formed the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes to re-evaluate the
regulatory scheme of the federal securities acts. 31 One member has sug-
386. See supra part V.B (discussing dangerous implications of Gustafson decision).
387. See supra note 2 (providing original text of § 12(2)).
388. See supra note 57 (providing § 2(10)'s broad definition of prospectus).
389. See supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (explaining textual analysis of
Pacific Dunlop court); see also supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (describing
Professor Loss's literal approach to interpreting § 12(2)).
390. See Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes,
Securities Act Release No. 7135, Exchange Act Release No. 35,368, 60 Fed. Reg. 9415,
9415 (Feb. 13, 1995) (announcing formation of committee to propose changes in current
procedures and investor rights); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Company Registration: Has
Its Time Come?, 213 N.Y. L.J., May 25, 1995, at 5 (summarizing possible changes that
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gested that the Advisory Committee may propose legislation to restore
Section 12(2) liability to private offerings.39' In the meantime, the SEC
should continue amicus participation in lower court cases that attempt to
discern the extent of the Gustafson holding. In its Gustafson amicus brief,
the SEC states that "private actions under the securities laws serve as a
necessary supplement to Commission enforcement actions and provide
compensation to injured investors."3" To salvage what remains of the
private action under Section 12(2), the SEC should remain active in lower
court litigation and should take interpretive positions consistent with a
narrow reading of the Gustafson holding. In addition, defrauded purchasers
should continue to bring suits under Section 12(2) and should attempt to
distinguish their facts from the Gustafson facts.393 Limiting the Gustafson
decision to its specific facts has the potential to ameliorate its harmful
effects. Consequently, although legislative reversal of Gustafson constitutes
the most desirable option to remain true to the congressional text and to the
regulatory scheme,3" the SEC and defrauded investors should take all other
possible steps in an attempt to confine the Gustafson holding to its facts.
VII. Conclusion
One commentator has stated that a Supreme Court decision "if not
reasoned, is at least authoritative. In the law, that's generally enough."395
However, this statement fails to hold true for the Gustafson decision. By
extending the Gustafson holding to exclude private offerings from the scope
of Section 12(2) liability,396 the majority unnecessarily overturns sixty years
committee plans to consider).
391. See Coffee, supra note 390, at 5 (asserting need for restoration of § 12(2) liability
to unregistered offerings in conjunction with revoking § 11 liability from all but initial
public offerings). Coffee asserts that this proposal has no effect on liability in the aggre-
gate. Id. However, it seems that his proposal would reduce the Gustafson-created uncer-
tainty as to defining private offerings. See also supra notes 354-61 and accompanying text
(suggesting post-Gustafson difficulties in distinguishing between private and public offer-
ings).
392. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 1, Gustafson (No. 93-404) (describing SEC interest in Gustafson
proceedings).
393. See supra part IV.A (providing facts of Gustafson).
394. See supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (providing Pacific Dunlop textual
analysis).
395. James D. Gordon, hI, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 TaX. L. REV. 383, 391 n.71 (1990).
396. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (finding that Gustafson decision
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of seemingly settled precedent.3" Results aside, the Gustafson majority's
novel rationale for its decision creates far more questions than it resolves.398
To remain true to congressional intent, the majority should have followed
the textual approach of the Pacific Dunlop court. 39  Alternatively, the
majority could have adopted the Ballay approach, which constitutes at least
an academically defensible position.4' ° Instead, the Gustafson Court ig-
nored years of scholarly commentary and judicial precedent and charted its
own course led by Section 10 of the 1933 Act."° A simple legislative
amendment would clarify the scope of Section 12(2) and restore the section
to its full scope of intended coverage.' Barring legislative reversal, the
only remaining option consists of damage control in the form of attempts
to narrow the holding of the Gustafson decision.4 3  Unfortunately, this
route of action will require, substantial litigation.' Increased federal
securities litigation means that nobody really wins. The majority fails to
achieve its policy goals, defrauded investors face decreased protection under
the securities laws, and issuers gain uncertainty and the costs of future
litigation. The dubious benefits of the Supreme Court's "authoritative"
answer to defining the parameters of Section 12(2) fail to outweigh its
potential costs, and thus, in this case, the weight of authority alone is not
enough.
excludes private offerings from scope of § 12(2) protection against fraud).
397. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1082 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "every Court of Appeals to consider the issue has ruled that private
placements are subject to section 12(2)"); Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 1270 (accusing
majority of overturning settled law); see also supra part V (describing implications of
Gustafson decision).
398. See supra part IV.D (criticizing Gustafson majority opinion).
399. See Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir.
1993) (upholding broad application of § 12(2) to both initial and secondary market transac-
tions), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994); see also supra notes 48-75 and accompany-
ing text (providing Pacific Dunlop analysis).
400. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.)
(holding that § 12(2) applies only to initial public offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820
(1991); see also supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text (explaining approach of Ballay
court). See generally Weiss, supra note 8 (advocating Ballay approach and result).
401. See supra part DI (reviewing past analyses of text, context, and legislative history
of § 12(2) of 1933 Act).
402. See supra part VI.A (proposing legislative change to § 12(2)).
403. See supra part VI.B (suggesting SEC and investor remedial actions).
404. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text (describing need for further
litigation to answer questions left open by Gustafson Court).
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